Despite the Cabinet of Ministers' adoption of Resolution No. 875, which restored the export of Ukrainian defense products, this mechanism has not become popular among private manufacturers. The introduction of a requirement to prepay 20–30% of the cost of weaponry simply makes export unprofitable, because even the notion that Ukrainian weapons are necessarily cheaper than Western ones is false.

Nor should one expect that European armies are simply dreaming of the opportunity to purchase Ukrainian drones, and that local defense companies will simply give up their market. In reality, Ukrainian weapons manufacturers face a difficult struggle in which the authorities must help and facilitate, not restrict.

Otherwise, when the multibillion-dollar defense order disappears, no more than 20 companies may remain of Ukrainian Defense Tech. This was stated in an interview with AIN by the executive director of the Ukrainian Weapons Council, Ihor Fedirko, who is also one of the jury members of the AIN Awards.

Executive Director of the Ukrainian Weapons Council Ihor Fedirko

The AIN Awards 2026 will recognize Ukrainian defense-tech startups, growth-stage companies, and investment funds that are developing Ukraine's defense industry. Applications for participation in AIN Awards 2026 can be submitted via the link.

Has Resolution No. 875, which restored the export of Ukrainian weapons, changed anything?

The current Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 875, which introduced a special mechanism alongside the regular procedure, is a non-functional, unviable document developed by the then composition of the Ministry of Defense, which the new team is now trying to revive. But what is embedded in it [ed. — collection of 20–30% of the value] is already flawed, because it significantly raises the export price of Ukrainian weaponry.

Because the notion that all Ukrainian weaponry is significantly cheaper is false. For example, some Ukrainian armored vehicle manufacturers have already encountered the fact that producing armored vehicles in European countries is cheaper. There, logistics costs are lower, as are salaries, compared to our salaries in the defense sector.

Also, the minimum threshold of 15 million hryvnias, i.e., about 300 thousand euros, makes it impossible to conclude contracts when a country wants to buy a small test batch. And along with this, a whole range of small and medium-sized companies with small volumes find themselves without the possibility of export.

I know that in the NSDC in October of this year they spoke of over 400 applications reviewed, more than 90% approvals, and over 18 permits for the sale of finished products, including to companies like Drone Dominance. This is general statistics of the commission's work, but not the result of Resolution No. 875.

In my opinion, 95% of these approvals are for exports from state defense companies. That is, private companies, which currently make up about 70% of Ukraine's defense industry, likely hardly used this resolution.

After all, the very notion that foreign countries are joyfully waiting for Ukraine to export weapons to them is false. The government of every European country maximally protects its manufacturers, who are quite capable of producing everything the same as we do. The same fiber-optic FPVs, mother drones, naval drones, which now only the lazy are not making, UGVs... You just need to go to any defense exhibition and see on company stands, even from Luxembourg, all the same things, one-to-one, that Ukrainian companies offer.

One of the few paths remaining is the creation of joint ventures. Because everyone wants localized production, because it's a matter of national security — to place production domestically. Otherwise, we simply won't be allowed into foreign markets.

Defense ministries of other countries invest not in purchasing drones, not even in technologies, but in creating their own ecosystems, following the example of Ukraine's Brave1. And they also invest in their own companies that have representative offices in Ukraine, for the sake of the experience those will gain.

Ready-made drones are purchased only for training and testing solutions. Because for mass drone procurement, European armies need to change their military doctrines. No country's armed forces can arm themselves with something that is not provided for by doctrine. And no one has changed it, so all that remains are experimental units that have special conditions.

The chance for Ukrainian companies is to enter these ecosystems through joint ventures and offer individual solutions for each specific country. Because Portugal and Poland have absolutely different requirements. Moreover, it is impossible to limit oneself to Europe alone, because Russians are actively working in the defense markets of third countries, and they must be squeezed out of there.

Therefore, the Ukrainian government must create a policy for this — clear, structured legislative and subordinate regulatory legal documents, unified transparent "rules of the game."

What prospect awaits Ukrainian defense industry if this is not done?

If this is not done, then in a conditional year after the war ends, when the multibillion-dollar domestic state defense order — which is currently mostly funded by foreign aid — comes to an end, 10–20 companies will remain of Ukrainian defense industry.

Also false is the notion that large European defense companies will buy our Defense Tech companies. Such giants as KNDS, BAE Systems, Rheinmetall, and others are not ready for fast development cycles lasting six months; this is incomprehensible to them. Instead, they very actively invest money in the narrative that a war like the one in Ukraine will not happen again, that it is a local story, so there is no sense in buying drones. But 155-mm shells will be needed, as will air defense systems and precision-guided bombs, while "little drones" are exclusively a Ukrainian story "for the poor."

Instead, already now in Europe, for example in Germany, in the shadow of Rheinmetall, new companies are already growing, whose leadership openly says they are creating German defense industry 4.0. These are so far medium and small companies that are flexible, fast, ready for various products and changes in direction of activity, having certain connections with the defense ministries of their own countries. It is with them that there is an opportunity to work mutually beneficially.

But for this, the Ukrainian government must finally create a policy regarding international defense cooperation, but p