The processes in all countries with transition economies were not unambiguous. In particular, the transformation lasted throughout the 1990s and was accompanied by hyperinflation. The restructuring of the economic system was postponed or took place much more harshly, with greater costs than expected. The reasons for such a situation were, as a rule, explained by external factors: the duration of the functioning of the command-administrative system, the hypertrophied share of heavy industry in the national economic complex, cultural traditions, the mentality of the nation, and so on. But at the same time, the proposed theoretical-economic basis of recipes for the recovery of society and the rapid overcoming of the systemic crisis was not called into question.
And the main development trends of the last decade, including even failures during economic reforms, generally confirmed the correctness of the chosen theoretical approach to market transformations: the Eastern European and Baltic countries, where the most important points of the standard program of international financial organizations were implemented, were able to overcome the transformation crisis relatively quickly. Meanwhile, the CIS countries, particularly Russia and Ukraine, which were less consistent in implementing the proposed program, continue to struggle for economic recovery to this day. The most illustrative examples of the successful implementation of the standard model, successfully modified in accordance with the specifics of the national economy, can be considered Poland, the Czech Republic, and Estonia.
In addition, there are also peculiarities of the monetary sphere of countries with transition economies that leave an additional imprint on macroeconomic development. For example, the real first results called into question the optimistic forecasts of not only Eastern European but also Western experts. In particular, the Polish government expected a 3% decline in GDP in 1990, and in 1991 hoped for a 3.5% increase. In reality, GDP declined during those years by 12% and 7%, respectively. But the errors in estimates of economic development at the initial stage of reforms in the Czech Republic and Hungary were insignificant. In turn, the Russian government predicted the end of the phase of falling production by the end of 1992, but in fact, stabilization of the economy (and even then uncertain) was achieved only in 1997. And the following year it was interrupted by the financial crisis in Southeast Asia, which covered primarily countries with transition economies.
In Ukraine, the decline in GDP in 1994 alone amounted to 23%, together with inflation that was record-breaking compared to world standards, reaching 10,256% in 1993 as a result of the transition to world prices for energy carriers. Economic growth began only in 2000. But for the more successful countries of the Central and Eastern European region, such a starting point was 1994. At the same time, the Polish economy has been steadily progressing since 1992.
Ukraine's monetary policy in 1991-2002 was characterized by certain mistakes. In particular, the hyperinflation of 1993 was caused by emission support of the economy, the currency crisis of 1998 was caused by the "pyramid" of OVDPs [domestic government bonds], the ineffectiveness of the currency corridor policy, abuse of administrative methods of regulating the currency market, and insufficient independence of the National Bank of Ukraine. The positive features include the successful monetary reform of 1996, the overcoming of the currency-financial crisis, and the stability of the currency market in recent years.
As we can see, the changes in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe cannot be characterized as unambiguously progressive and problem-free. According to International Monetary Fund specialist J. Odling-Smee, "economic achievements were extremely irregular in nature." He emphasized that "while in some countries there was stable economic growth for many years, other countries lagged behind them. This can be partly explained by geographical location (especially proximity to the EU), partly by the initial industrial structure, and also, in particular, by the quality of the economic policy of these countries."
As for the latter, the decisive criteria for a successful transition were four main points: 1) persistence in implementing the policy of macroeconomic stabilization; 2) structural reforms across a wide range of economic sectors, in particular strict budget constraints; 3) the creation of the legal and regulatory framework necessary for the functioning of a market economy; and 4) ensuring a reliable system of social protection that would soften the inevitable breakdown of the social order and thus ensure constant support for the transition process." In this regard, even Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic can give Ukraine lessons in market transformation.
The first puzzle that specialists overlooked was not the timing of the onset but the scale and depth of the decline in production during the changes. In addition, the divergence of economic development paths of a number of CIS countries from most countries of Central and Eastern Europe in the medium term gave rise to talk about the possible loss of controllability of transformation processes, which was not without reason identified with the danger of "economic wilding." Finally, the process of institutional transformations came to the center of attention of theorists only when, with great delay, the awareness came that it is precisely the evolution of market institutions and organizations that is the key problem of the transformation of economic systems in Eastern Europe.
And in the situation with Ukraine, it is necessary to take into account the processes in the Russian Federation. After all, Ukraine's economic development is also regulated by the state of affairs in the neighboring state, and therefore the influence of Russia's currency market directly on the development of Ukraine's monetary sphere is also significant.
Currently, Russia's economic development is characterized by peculiarities of the strengthening of the national unit — the ruble — relative to the world's leading currencies. In 2003 alone, the real strengthening of the ruble amounted to 17% against the US dollar. Moreover, according to Russian specialists, this is not an accident but a medium-term trend of economic development.
Practically all countries of Eastern Europe have gone through a similar period. In 2003, fundamental changes took place in the balance of payments, and now the strengthening of the exchange rate is connected not only with the price of oil. Russia is experiencing a noticeable inflow of currency. In addition to the return of Russian capital and an increase in the inflow of portfolio investments, it received 5 billion dollars from the population selling dollars. But the ruble will not stop there. According to estimates by Russian experts, in 1998 the ruble was devalued too much, and the potential for strengthening the ruble in real terms has not yet been exhausted; it amounts to 10-15%.
Thus, the foregoing convinces us that the specifics of the transformation economy in each individual country require "personification" of minimizing the negative consequences of market changes. First of all, this concerns the peculiarities of emerging from the economic crisis, which in situations directly related to Ukraine covered a fairly long period and exceeded the forecast parameters of the transformation state.
In addition, the national currency systems of countries with transition economies in many respects experience the determining influence of the parameters of the world currency system, but at the same time, they may also differ from them due to the peculiarities of the economy.
Let us note that the currency-financial sphere is also influenced by factors of an economic and foreign-economic nature. Moreover, they interact heterogeneously, that is, the specific state of the economy can cause both a positive and a negative result. Therefore, minimizing the negative impacts of transformation processes requires determining the general parameters of the monetary sphere of countries with a typical model of economic development. The formation of general approaches to further development depends on this.