For about three years, the Russians were unable to inflict serious damage on bridges in Ukraine. But now their strikes have become more precise and pose an increasing threat to Ukraine's critical infrastructure. The reason is the missile guidance systems that allow their impact on a target to be corrected even under conditions of satellite navigation suppression — they have been improved, AIN wrote.
The technical characteristics specifically have changed
How the Russians improved the guidance systems of their 9M723 ballistic missiles from the Iskander OTRK, what role satellite intelligence plays in this, and how to protect strategic facilities from such strikes if Ukraine does not have a sufficient number of anti-ballistic missiles.
— What are the specific features of the missile's flight trajectory before impact, and what role do the homing heads play in this?
— At the final stage of flight, the missile must perform a maneuver that has two purposes. The first is to complicate the operation of air defense systems. The second, no less important, is to reduce speed to a level at which the homing head can function fully.
During entry into dense layers of the atmosphere at ultra-high speeds, a so-called plasma sheath forms in front of the missile — a layer of ionized air. This can block the passage
There is also another important aspect — the time remaining for the seeker head to operate. The range of the 9E436 optical seeker head is approximately 15 km, of the active
Photo from a study by the Kyiv Scientific Research Institute of Forensic Expertise
If a missile travels at a speed of 7.5 km/s, it covers this distance in a matter of seconds. In such a short period of time, trajectory correction is significantly limited. Instead, at a speed of 700–800 m/s, the time spent in the seeker's operating zone increases substantially — to approximately 20 seconds.
— What is known about the radar and optical homing heads that the Russians use, and what has changed?
— I did not particularly emphasize optical homing heads. Technologically, this is an extremely complex solution. There is information about the presence of an optical homing head, there are even photographs of it. But, I think, the Russians use primarily
Tu-22M3 with Kh-22 missiles
At the beginning of the full-scale war, they massively used Kh-22 and Kh-32 missiles to strike bridges in Kyiv and other regions of Ukraine. At that time, we were seriously concerned about this threat and were looking for ways to protect against it. But there were no such hits that would lead to serious damage. For about three years, they did not carry out such strikes on bridges at all.
Today we see precise hits, moreover with the use of significantly more powerful missiles. Obviously, something has changed. I believe that first of all, the characteristics of the
One of the reasons may be the use of new satellite images obtained with the help of high-precision
Public satellite image in SAR range of the Paton Bridge from ESA
— How can Ukraine counteract this?
— There is a completely realistic scenario. We need key information about the technical characteristics of this homing head. On its basis, it is possible to formulate a technical specification for manufacturers so that they can produce means
Having received enough information, manufacturers will be able to develop the appropriate electronic warfare means in a relatively short time. And most importantly — in Ukraine there are manufacturers who have the necessary capabilities for this. We have both the specialists and the technological capabilities.
— What timelines are we talking about, and how quickly could the Russians come up with a response to our decision?
High-precision homing heads are very expensive. The Russians will not be able to simply change the transmitter frequency in two or three days or even in half a year. There is very little space inside the radar itself, and its dimensions cannot be increased.
In order to change the characteristics of the seeker, everything actually needs to be done from scratch. This is precisely that wonderful story when it is easier to rework electronic warfare means than the guidance system.
If there is at least information about the operating frequency of this radar, in my opinion, we will need a month or two to find a countermeasure solution.
Such means themselves do not need to be produced in serial production. Very simplified — one means per city may be sufficient. Perhaps three means, if we are talking about narrowly directed antennas and different directions of missile arrival.
But these are all small sums compared to the cost of the missiles. If a seeker head, for example, costs $500,000, then an electronic warfare asset may cost $100,000, or even less.
— What methods of protecting bridges from modern threats already exist, and how effective are they in practice?
We can determine when a missile with a homing head is flying. After all, its flight profile is somewhat different: it significantly reduces speed. This is almost an art. But it is also a signal to assess the potential of using smoke or other means of masking for optics.
The time window is nevertheless extremely short. Even if the system of pyrotechnic cartridges that will create the so-called screen is activated as quickly as possible. For such a huge object as a bridge, at least a minute will be needed.
Theoretically, this could work. But in practice, it turns out that we would have to deploy these smoke means in clear sunny weather during every launch of an enemy ballistic missile.
The smoke deployment system could be integrated into the air defense system conditionally via a "button" that air defense would press. But even under such conditions, I estimate the minimum response time at approximately the same one minute. The effectiveness of such a method of protection is reduced.
There are also so-called passive methods of countermeasures — special traps and barges with corner reflectors.
Vessel with corner reflectors
Near the Crimean Bridge, for example, the Russians have placed a bunch of metal structures in the water. These are so-called pyramids and spheres that additionally reflect
In fact, they are creating new
If we talk about ways of countering ballistic missiles in the absence of anti-ballistic missiles, these are among the few options currently available. Yes, they are imperfect and technically complex. But the loss of a bridge, in my opinion, is a far more serious problem than the cost of attempts to protect it.
— Why is it easier to counter: optical or radar homing heads?
Ways of countering
This is also a complex process. But if you consider that rebuilding a destroyed bridge could cost billions of dollars, then the issue of its protection takes on a completely different scale.