The Ukrainian authorities do not like solving problems. As voters have already come to understand, they do not like deciding anything at all. All important issues must become a "subject of broad public discussion," the President likes to repeat. That is, to hang in the air in the hope that, as the laws of psychology assert, they will fall into the 60% of problems that resolve themselves without the active participation of the party. But the language issue for some reason is not being resolved. And it is not even being suppressed after the elections are over. The problem is that during previous election campaigns, after the CEC announced the results, the alignment of political forces became absolutely clear to both voters and politicians. Pro-Russian political forces radicalize the language issue in order to skim the cream of Russian-speaking voters' votes once every few years. After the vote, excessive political activity in satisfying the "constitutional rights of Russian-speaking citizens" no longer brought any practical benefit. Therefore it abruptly stopped.

Thus Leonid Kuchma once amused himself with bilingualism. In the post-Soviet space, the cruelest joke on the Russian-speaking electorate was played by Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin. He won the presidential elections with slogans of loyalty to Russia and granting Russian the status of a second state language. But then, with the help of the Constitutional Court, he put an end to legislative initiatives to legalize Russian. This was done more than once in the countries of the former Soviet empire, with the exception of the Baltic states. Political forces promised legislative support for the Russian-speaking environment, but forgot or "objectively could not" keep the promises made to voters during election campaigns. However, the pro-Russian political parties and blocs of independent Ukraine in its 15th year of existence became an exception. The Party of Regions, PSPU (Vitrenko Bloc), SDPU(o) and the "Ne Tak!" Bloc decided to bring their promises to the stage of implementation. Granting Russian the status of a second state language is an impossible task even for the most powerful faction of the regionalists, numbering 186 deputies. Although Yanukovych's party promises to immediately take up consideration of language policy at the very first session, the formation of a constitutional majority around the language issue is impossible even to imagine.

The Party of Regions, living up to its name, started with the regions. Even before the elections, in the personal bloc "For Yanukovych" together with pro-Russian political forces, it initiated a republican referendum on granting Russian the status of a second state language in Crimea. Although the Ministry of Justice recognized the decision of the Verkhovna Rada of Crimea as illegal, since granting state status to any language "cannot be the subject of a republican referendum," the initiative played its pre-election role. The prompt reaction of the Russophiles to conflicts with Russia over the presence of the Black Sea Fleet and the ownership of lighthouses was duly appreciated by Crimean voters with an unformed national identity. As a result, the "For Yanukovych!" Bloc and the "Union" party undividedly rule in the Crimean parliament. After the Crimean peninsula came the turn of local councils of the Eastern region. The Sevastopol city council, Luhansk, and now the Donetsk regional council granted Russian the status of a regional language. Now citizens and state institutions of the territories under the jurisdiction of these councils will seemingly be able to use Russian in official communication as freely as Ukrainian. It is not even worth starting with the fact that they never used Ukrainian freely. The Charter for Regional or Minority Languages, with which the Party of Regions armed itself, is too serious a European document on the protection of the language rights of minorities, to which the Russian minority undoubtedly belongs, to be ignored.

After several decisions of local councils and the complete ignoring of calls from the camp of political opponents not to allow a language split in Ukraine, the Party of Regions is not going to give up. In the eastern region it enjoys the support of an absolute majority, so it is not troubled by the conclusions of Serhiy Holovaty, dismissed by the Verkhovna Rada from the post of acting Minister of Justice, about violations of Art. 10 and Art. 92 of the Constitution. The Fundamental Law establishes that the procedure for the use of languages is determined exclusively by the laws of Ukraine. So what? Has the Ukrainian government, in the person of the President and the Cabinet of Ministers, violated the Constitution even once? Starting from the combining of posts and ending with the non-recognition of the government's resignation and at the same time the very text of the Constitution. Through decisions of local councils, the Party of Regions demonstrates to the authorities that it will rule in "its" territories as it wishes, and strongly recommends that "Our Ukraine" not poke its nose in there. The party of power is indeed wary of this. This is evidenced by the appointment of Volodymyr Lohvynenko as governor of Donetsk region. And this after Yekhanurov pompously declared: "We do not coordinate the appointment of heads of regional state administrations with political forces." Since these positions are not a subject of political bargaining and are coordinated only by the President and the Cabinet. In reality, however, the authorities made concessions to the Party of Regions.

Since the language problem is raised and hyped only by the Party of Regions and a few political forces, several conclusions can be drawn from this. There is no language issue as an ethnoconflictogenic factor in Ukraine. Due to the kinship and similarity of the Russian and Ukrainian languages, the absence of obstacles to their use, the high level of tolerance and conformism of the majority of Ukrainians. As a result of which Ukrainian is more discriminated against than Russian. In Ukraine, the language issue has become a political instrument in the hands of predominantly one political force — the Party of Regions. It skillfully uses it to accentuate the split between East and West and to destabilize the political and interethnic situation. After all, destabilizing the political situation is a blow to the authorities, which appear incapable of responding to domestic political challenges. The main goal of the Party of Regions in its long-term strategy is to push "Our Ukraine" into opposition in subsequent elections; in the short term, to enter the parliamentary coalition that the government will form. The language issue is an instrument for giving political weight to the Party of Regions, turning it into an influential political force that cannot be ignored. Through the language issue it is also trying to cement its electorate.

On the whole, for the language situation in Ukraine, the actions of the Party of Regions to protect the Russian language are a positive phenomenon. The threat of legalizing the Russian language mobilizes sympathizers of Ukrainian and prompts the authorities to pay attention to the situation of the state language specifically. However, the language issue is not one of those that politicians should play with. Questions of national belonging are too painful and dangerous. The Party of Regions may not be able to cope with the fire it is kindling to gain power and protect its interests. In the chain: promoting bilingualism — entering parliament — implementing bilingualism — there has never been a final link. And such an algorithm worked quite well. Otherwise, Samuel Huntington's forecast about the inevitable split of Ukraine into two civilizational parts — eastern and western — may come true. And the Party of Regions will benefit from this least of all.