Modern warfare is increasingly unfolding in the cognitive domain — the sphere of the struggle for perception, algorithms, and the speed of decision-making. Recently, the founder of G-Next Intelligence, Oleksii Teplukhin, took part in the Defence Innovation Highway tour across Northern Europe, where he spoke with representatives of defense structures, the military, investors, and scientists from Norway, Sweden, and Denmark.

Specifically for AIN.UA, Oleksii explains why Scandinavia is looking to Ukraine primarily for non-kinetic experience, how AI technologies are changing approaches to analyzing frontline data, and how Ukrainian miltech can pass critical knowledge to allies without revealing sensitive details to the enemy.

Kinetic destruction versus cognitive shift

Most European security institutions still perceive war through the lens of kinetics: the number of barrels, the range of engagement, the tonnage of ammunition. However, modern warfare is, among other things, a war over how events are perceived by society, the military, and governments.

An example that perfectly illustrates this difference: the total destruction of Bakhmut had a significantly smaller impact on shaping the strategic perception of the future victor than regular strikes by Ukrainian UAVs on logistics in Crimea or deep strikes on Russian infrastructure.

Or another example — the recent strikes on Kyiv bridges. They did not physically destroy the structures, but created a cognitive effect: the idea that the left bank could be cut off from the right bank became fixed in the minds of the city's residents.

The same applies to the assessment of actions inside russia. We all see strikes on russian oil refineries or Wildberries warehouses and can calculate the economic losses. But technically, these destructions by themselves will not lead to the fall of the regime.

So the question is: what must happen for public opinion in russia to change so that the risk of being beaten or going to prison becomes less than the risk of facing the consequences of war? And how can we make them realize that these risks are beginning to decrease? Remember the Ukrainian Maidan: when they introduced "15 years for wearing a helmet," it only caused irony and a backlash, because the cognitive perception of risks in society had already changed.

Russia wages cognitive warfare systematically, trying to impose on Europe a narrative that this is a temporary crisis rather than a long-term global challenge. The Western world has become very vulnerable: from election manipulation via social media and bots to hybrid incidents with drones over allied territories, where European instructions simply have no algorithm for what to do, and the drone is left to fly on.

Ukraine today is the only platform in the world where cognitive warfare is being tested at the highest speed and on the largest scale.

Why laboratories are losing to the Ukrainian front

During the tour — which spanned 4 days, 3 countries, and over 50 key representatives of defense educational institutions, military structures, business, and investors — we were most frequently asked:

"What tools and methods are working right now, and what do we need to pay attention to?"

Foreign developers and AI companies are seeking to obtain Ukrainian combat data to train their models. AI here is an indispensable tool, as the volume of information for analysis has long exceeded human capabilities and classical algorithms. But raw information by itself has limited value. Any AI solution developed in a Western laboratory is worth little if it has not undergone practical testing on the battlefield.

The real value lies in the methods, tools, and their validation. Technically, assembling a "data lake," setting up analytics, connecting AI, and drawing a convenient interface is a relatively straightforward task.

But only what a military serviceman with combat experience says "This worked" is truly valuable.

How to share knowledge without revealing sensitive information

When a product of a Ukrainian miltech company proves its effectiveness on the front line, it becomes essential for our allies as well. A dilemma immediately arises: how to transfer the method while at the same time making sure it does not fall into the enemy's hands? If the Russians learn about our methods and algorithms, they will quickly find countermeasures or use them against us.

At G-Next Intelligence, we resolve this dilemma through a split architecture: the defense expertise and methodology are one system, but the final solutions for the Ukrainian unit and the European customer are completely different.

Neither Europe nor our allies need blind copying of Ukrainian decisions.

What works directly in the trenches near Pokrovsk is not suitable for standard military exercises in Scandinavia. The allies need our experience adapted to their realities, doctrines, and needs.

That is precisely why the modern architecture of miltech platforms (in particular, the G-Next Platform concept and the G-Next BOX architectural access separation) is built this way: the platform incorporates defense expertise but does not contain sensitive combat data or the final algorithms of Ukraine's Defense Forces. It allows for the deployment of both a combat contour for the front and an adapted system for partners in a closed, secure environment with strict auditing of actions.

Speed of analytics as an element of the Long War Stack

A separate technology — whether a closed messenger or a separate AI model — no longer provides a strategic advantage.

Why are innovations in Ukraine created and implemented faster? Not because we have no bureaucracy — it is equally slow both there and here. The difference is that in Ukraine during wartime, bureaucracy ceases to be an impenetrable barrier. When there is a critical need, we are able to employ new approaches even before formal procedures are found — we do the work on the assumption that our results will speak for themselves to clients.

A simple example from our project's history: in the first days of the full-scale war, we encountered the fact that thousands of shocked citizens were eager to pass operational information to the military. No standard tools existed for processing such a volume of messages.

The ability to quickly create a system for systematizing this potential of civil intelligence determined the effectiveness of actions in the very first hours. Russia's neighbors should prepare such tools in advance and assess the scale already now.

Destruction of enemy narratives and a "testing ground of trust"

Today, pro-Russian forces in Europe are promoting simple and harmful narratives: "this is not our war," "russia will win anyway," "why should we pay for this?" The answers to these challenges are more complex, and they include passing on our practical experience.

When European allies understand the real consequences of threats, know how to respond to them, and see that Ukraine faces this every day and has a non-theoretical possibility of emerging victorious, it is much easier for them to make decisions about support.

From a business perspective, Northern Europe for Ukrainian miltech is a target market, solvent clients, and a powerful investment ecosystem. For G-Next Intelligence, for example, the first pre-seed investments came specifically from the Danish fund Final Frontier.

Today, this cooperation has transformed into joint work with the Danish defense sector, where the investor participates in panel discussions at the Ukrainian House in Copenhagen and acts not merely as a source of capital, but also as a partner who organizes meetings and helps to better understand the market.

Ukraine can and must become a "testing ground of trust" for Europe, but our cooperation must be based on three clear principles.

By passing on our cognitive and technological experience, we help allies realize the real scale of the threats and convince them that supporting Ukraine is the only way to secure Europe itself.