Thesis 1a. But even if the country still retains a clearly defined supreme authority, it will be "powerless," since the proposed changes to the Constitution do not provide any guarantees of its operability. For example, the Verkhovna Rada will not have the ability to work within the legal framework, since bill № 4105 does not recognize the Rules of Procedure of the Verkhovna Rada as law. Therefore, challenging their violation will effectively become impossible, including in the Constitutional Court. Thus, violations will become a permanent parliamentary phenomenon, especially on the part of the leadership of the Verkhovna Rada. (the consequences of non-compliance with the Rules of Procedure can be observed in the Ukrainian parliament over the past six months). Or for example, because the issue of legal consequences and the procedure for officials resigning before the Verkhovna Rada is not regulated, a situation of absence of executive power may arise, when the parliament does not accept the resignation of "old" officials and does not look for "new" ones. Or does the old Cabinet continue to perform its functions until the newly formed government begins work? A question without an answer.
Thesis 2. The bill violates the principle of separation of powers, turning it into a "matryoshka," into a "thing in itself." The Cabinet of Ministers (defined by the Constitution as the executive body of power) will become part of the Verkhovna Rada (the legislative body of power). And all other duties, such as the duties of the Prime Minister, will be performed by officials "on a voluntary basis." (according to Art. 78 of bill № 4105: "People's Deputies of Ukraine exercise their powers on a permanent basis. They cannot have another representative mandate, be in civil service, hold other paid positions (except for the positions of members of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine), ...").
Thesis 3. Bill № 4105 makes local administrations completely dependent on higher authorities: the higher local council, the Cabinet of Ministers, the Verkhovna Rada, the Prosecutor's Office, the Constitutional Court, etc. The bill does not recognize local self-government bodies and does not provide them with any guarantees. The right to cancel decisions of local authorities is granted directly to the Cabinet of Ministers, local administrations, and indirectly to the Verkhovna Rada. In addition, the Prosecutor's Office receives the right to demand poorly substantiated inspections. And the Constitutional Court, relying on the absence of legal guarantees for local self-government bodies in the proposed Constitutional changes, will not have the ability to protect their interests.
Thesis 4. All deputies are equal, but, thanks to bill № 4105, some will be "more equal than others." The bill introduces the concept of a "coalition of parliamentary factions," which consists of a majority of people's deputies from their constitutional composition and endows this coalition with significant powers. At the same time, the rights of the parliamentary "minority" (opposition) are not discussed at all. That is, the bill legalizes the rightslessness of the opposition. The opposition is effectively deprived of the right to submit proposals regarding the candidacy of the Prime Minister and the personal composition of the Cabinet of Ministers. (Art. 83 of the bill - two new paragraphs have been introduced concerning the rights of the coalition of parliamentary factions).
Thesis 5. Bill № 4105 will return to the hands of the Prosecutor's Office the "club" for disobedient local authorities. The general supervision by the prosecutor's office over compliance with laws by authorities is being restored. Such supervision is inherent in authoritarian regimes and was one of the repressive instruments under the Soviet regime, especially during Stalin's times. The restoration of just this one provision in the Constitution effectively nullifies Art. 1 of the Constitution in the part defining Ukraine as a democratic, rule-of-law state.
Thesis 6. Strengthens the President's power and makes it arbitrary. The President can dissolve parliament at his own will, since under the condition of adopting amendments to the Constitution, the Prime Minister does not have to countersign this presidential decision with his signature (the last paragraph of Art. 106 of bill № 4105, paragraph 8 of the President's powers has been removed), and therefore does not have the ability to regulate this issue in certain cases. In the matter of dissolving parliament, the Prime Minister becomes a bystander. Moreover, in the proposed changes, the dissolution of parliament also means the dissolution of the Cabinet of Ministers, and therefore can be carried out on a fabricated basis precisely for the reason of the Government's resignation. The President will have a direct influence on the Constitutional Court. According to bill № 4105, he appoints half of the judges of the Constitutional Court (9 people). The other half is appointed by the Verkhovna Rada, two-thirds of whose composition supported the incumbent President. Will the opposition be able to protect its rights in such a Constitutional Court? This is a direct usurpation of power. The President will effectively be able to "independently" change the Constitution. After all, both for his election by parliament and for amending the Constitution of Ukraine, the support of the same number of deputies is required - two-thirds of its constitutional composition. Why shouldn't those who elected the president also make the Constitution "more convenient"?
Thesis 7. The constitutional norm prohibiting any influence on judges is violated. The Verkhovna Rada will be able to influence judges through the possibilities of their appointment and reappointment. The bill contains a proposal to replace the indefinite election of judges with a fixed-term one (for 10 years).
Thesis 8. People's deputies can interfere unlimitedly in the execution of the budget by the Cabinet of Ministers In item 6. of Art. 116 of the bill, the sentence that the Cabinet submits to the Verkhovna Rada bills on amending the law on the State Budget has been removed. This is a significant change, since according to the same item, it is the Cabinet of Ministers that executes the budget, and therefore also makes amendments to it. And no other branch of power can interfere in the competence of the Cabinet of Ministers (para. 2 of Art. 6 of the Constitution). The removal of the said sentence means that the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, through the right of legislative initiative of deputies, can unlimitedly interfere in the execution of the budget by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.
Thesis 9. Kuchma may remain President until 2009. According to Art. 103 of the current Constitution, the president is elected for 5 years. At the same time, item 6. of the final provisions states that the powers of the President elected by the citizens of Ukraine in 2004 terminate from the moment the newly elected President of Ukraine takes office after being elected by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine in 2006. Here it is unclear whether the President needs to be re-elected in 2006, violating Art. 103, or whether only the Verkhovna Rada will be re-elected in 2006, which will elect the President after the completion of his 5-year term in this position, i.e., in 2009.
Thesis 10. People's deputies lose the right to their own opinion Deputies lose their mandate not only in the case of their voluntary transition to another faction (which is fair), but also under the condition of forced expulsion from the faction. Such a practice may lead to trading in deputy mandates and corruption in the deputy corps of the legislative body of power.
Thesis 11. Unequal conditions for presidential candidates. The incumbent President, who is running again for the highest office, in the case of his non-election has the right to dissolve the Verkhovna Rada, while other candidates for this position do not have such a right. By the way, from this point of view, the incumbent President needs the support of only 151 deputies. In this case, any other candidate will not be able to be elected, and thus the Verkhovna Rada will always face a dilemma: either elect the incumbent President or face the dissolution of parliament. Moreover, this factor will operate with the same effectiveness even after two terms of the President in office. The Verkhovna Rada will not elect another President, and the incumbent President will say that it is not his fault, but the desire of the Verkhovna Rada.
Significant changes include those related to the restoration in bill № 4105 of the norms of the current Constitution that were intended to be abolished by bill № 4105 of 04.09. 2003, in particular: para. 4 of Art. 83 (on the term of office of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine during a state of war or emergency), item 34 of Article 85 (regarding sending an inquiry to the President of Ukraine), Article 88 (regarding the number of Deputy Chairmen of the Verkhovna Rada), para. 2-5 of Article 89 (regarding the creation of temporary special and temporary investigative commissions).
Conclusions
That is precisely why bill № 4105 should be regarded as a real attempt, under the guise of political reform, to carry out an anti-state coup in Ukraine.