One Hundred Days Of The New Leadership: The Take-Off Run Is Over

The first hundred days of the new government have witnessed triumphs and failures, indecision and vigor, naive emotions and cunning moves, revolutionary rhetoric and pragmatic actions. There have been staff “cuts and slashes”, public declarations, and amateurish intrigues. Some have had one hundred days of doubts, new ideas, and dawning responsibility. Others have had one hundred nights of pangs of conscience and fears of being arrested and parting with their assets. Thousands of documents have been signed, and as many have remained unapproved. 15,000 public servants have been replaced. Millions of Ukrainians have had their pensions and salaries raised. Millions of dollars saved by Ukrainians in banks and stocks have been devalued by the administrative revaluation of the national currency. Millions have come out of the shadow economy and into the state’s coffers.

The new authorities have been under close scrutiny by the international community, experts, the mass media, and the opposition. What do Ukrainians think of the leaders they chose? What do they accept, reject, believe, doubt, and expect? Answers to these questions can tell how many more hundreds or thousands of days the Ukrainian people will have this leadership.

One hundred days is enough for preliminary conclusions. The ZN offers its commentaries to a statistical survey conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology.

I. The President

In Brussels, Washington, and Warsaw, the President of Ukraine was hailed as if he were (the heroic cosmonaut Yuri) Gagarin.

In Moscow, during the pompous celebration of victory in WW II, the President was seated at the end of the VIP bench.

He is recognized as the informal leader of the reanimated GUAM [Georgia-Ukraine-Azerbaijan-Moldova].

Oligarchs importune him with servile offers to fund his initiatives, from restoring historical monuments to refurbishing his residence.

Both old and newly-appointed officials are afraid of the President, and complain to one another in a whisper that he is not the spineless Yushchenko they expected.

And the public is still under the spell of the new leaders’ language. The people still believe in the President as their ultimate protector.

Viktor Yushchenko enjoys an unprecedented popularity rating in Ukraine’s modern history. Most Ukrainians are not sure yet whether the new team deserves their trust, but more than half the population supports the President. This means they believe (or want to believe) that his team will play by the new rules.

Viktor Yushchenko is at a peak of popular support, which is very important to him. But it is no less important to follow through on his plans - both popular and unpopular. He is consciously ready to sacrifice some of his popularity in an effort to convince the people that Ukraine needs to join NATO. Speaking to Soviet Army veterans during the V-Day celebrations, he openly reiterated his call for reconciliation with veterans of the UPA [Ukrainian Insurgent Army - the military nationalist organization who fought against Nazi invaders and the Stalin regime during WW II]. He is convinced that Ukraine must change the language of negotiations with Russia from those of a vassal to those of a partner, and he is ready to be firm and go all the way. He knows what he is doing and what for. His position on these issues may be disputed, but it must be respected for consistency and resolve.

He said “my nation” on Independence Square [during the Orange Revolution]. He said “my power” on inauguration day. Such utterances sound improper for a democratic leader, but nobody seems to care.

So how does Yushchenko mean to use his strong powers to build a civilized state? There are three things he must do. Firstly, he must clearly determine his domestic and foreign policy priorities. Secondly, he must make key appointments and launch a highly effective mechanism of coordination within his team. Thirdly, he must define the basic human values in government-society relationships. Has Viktor Yushchenko coped with these tasks in the first hundred days of his presidency?

He has determined the priorities for Ukraine’s foreign policy clearly enough. The top priority proceeds from the presumption of Ukraine as part and parcel of Europe and its eventual reunion into the European family. He has hardly advanced any closer to Brussels. Nor has he managed to convert the fact of the Orange Revolution into a significant influx of investments. In informal conversations, G-7 envoys express surprise with the new Ukrainian government’s erratic moves. They explain that investors are discouraged by the fixed prices for gasoline and meat, the tremendous social bias of the national budget, and endless talks about re-privatization. The President has still given no clear answer to the question of which companies may change their owners, why or how.

The priorities in his domestic policy are clear: back-breaking work and no bribes. But why break backs?

Viktor Yushchenko has created a political party and named its potential allies for the 2006 parliamentary race, set out the course for constitutional reform, and delimited a field of activity for prosecutors. He chose not to waste any effort and time on forming a constitutional majority in the parliament. He has not managed to secure effective control over execution of his orders by his subordinates.

As to the second must-do task, the “staff revolution” in Ukraine has been practically completed, and its results are partly successful. The only way for the President to avoid problems with the other, unsuccessful part, is to avoid double standards with regard to old and new public servants. If neophytes break the law or lie, he must get rid of them as resolutely as he sacked those who discredited themselves under the previous government. So far, the President has not responded to well-known facts of such misdeeds, but has been excused by society.

Yulia Tymoshenko’s appointment to the post of Prime Minister was a serious and considered step for Yushchenko. Petro Poroshenko’s appointment to the post of National Security and Defense Council Secretary was a mistake. Obviously, Yushchenko did not find the proper place for Poroshenko’s huge potential and ambition in the new ladder of power.

The President should get credit for giving a lot of liberty to the government. He does not try to boss the ministers around, telling them what to do or how. On the one hand, this demonstrates his trust in them. But on the other, in some cases it would be better to instruct the inexperienced ministers on certain strategic and practical assignments.

The only orders that Yushchenko gives government officials concern appointments, which he regards as a confirmation of his presidential powers. Responding to some critical remarks about “unwise” appointments, he said, “I am the President. Why can’t I appoint this or that man to this or that position?” The problem is that he promotes his close acquaintances, friends, former schoolmates, their friends, and neighbors. Very often their intellectual and professional level is well below the standards he proclaims. This certainly harms his cause and discredits him. Some try to do something about this weakness of his. Others connive to exploit it.

Now Yushchenko spends a lot more time at work than he did when he was the Prime Minister. He seldom communicates with ministers in person, and sees the Prime Minister once a week. He gets reports on the economic situation from Petro Poroshenko and on the political situation from [Presidential Secretariat Chief] Alexander Zinchenko, thus seeing the country through their eyes. The chiefs of the Security Service and the Intelligence are infrequent guests in his office. There is also his first aide Alexander Tretyakov and his old and indispensable assistant Vera Ulyanchenko. These people make his closed circuit, sort of isolating him from the outside world. But do they ensure his work is efficient? The answer is no.

The State Secretariats office is piled up with documents needing to be urgently signed by the President. The analytical and regional services work very poorly. For four years, Yushchenko was an opposition leader and said so many words that words mean little now. What he needs is action and initiative. Instead of patching holes and putting out fires, the government should concentrate on the country’s strategic development. But where are the materials for presidential initiatives?

Yushchenko’s initiatives go no further than the restoration of churches and architectural monuments, the creation of museums, and reviving the Cossack heritage. Yushchenko is an economist but has a distinctive humanitarian bias. The schism in Ukrainian society is a well-known fact, but he still has no fundamental, comprehensive, and detailed program for consolidating the nation.

Poroshenko assures us that a schedule of NSDC sessions for twelve months has been approved. Who approved it, and why is it unknown to a single member of the council? Apparently, Yushchenko is not interested in the NSDC as a body for strategic discussions, although it could be a very effective instrument for decision-making and creating a mechanism of interactions within the President’s team. The mechanism of preparations for NSDC sessions is still unclear. Over a hundred days Poroshenko has replaced one deputy and appointed one office manager. That is all he has done. The staffs of expert groups are incomplete. There is no analytical service to deal with important challenges. It looks as if Poroshenko is still sitting on his baggage. Where is Yushchenko’s draft bill on expanding the NSDC Secretary’s role, which he promised to submit to Parliament? Is he so unsure of its endorsement? Does he think his current scope is sufficient? Or is there any other reason?

And finally, a few words about human values. Yushchenko’s speech in Parliament during the endorsement of the Cabinet staff and the governors was in a way his Sermon on the Mount. He kept talking about public servants’ adherence to the “ten commandments”. At the same time, he pardons sinners at his own discretion. His request to journalists to “leave Zvarych alone” was a slap in his own face and an insult to those who believed that a minister could be sacked for telling lies [Justice Minister Roman Zvarych had said he was a Professor in his CV, concealing the fact that he had a only a bachelor’s degree from a US college]. Such a practice may well turn many away from the President.

Yushchenko tries to keep his finger on the country’s pulse, paying particular attention to law enforcement. But this attention is basically directed at the activities that are related to his pre-election promises to “jail bandits”, “return stolen enterprises to the state”, and bring “the pillars of the criminal regime to justice”.

As the statistical survey shows, 45 percent of respondents maintain that the President must have a hand in the investigation of the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze. Forty-one percent have the opposite opinion. The figures do not differ geographically, since the Gongadze case has no implication of being “witch hunt”. The ZN has a different opinion: the President must ensure non-interference with prosecutors’ work. This is his historical mission, which differs radically from what his predecessor did. But he must refrain from legally inconsiderate statements in the course of the investigation. He can only demand that the Prosecutor General’s Office conduct a complete and effective investigation. If it fails, he can use his right to dismiss the Prosecutor General.

The people expect the President to keep his word and finally solve the problem of the Kryvorizhstal steel works [the metallurgical giant bought by billionaires Viktor Pinchuk and Rinat Akhmetov at a below-market-value price]. But how can he do it: pressure the court, or agree with Pinchuk and Akhmetov “amicably”? Only one-third of respondents are concerned about the possible consequences of the announced re-privatization. The President needs Kryvorizhstal as a political trophy. The budget needs it as a reimbursement, and the business community needs it as an instructive lesson. But there is one important thing for all: in a democratic society, the law is sometimes more important than justice. If the Ukrainian judiciary succeeded in harmonizing these, the President would deserve the highest praises.

Unlike in the Gongadze and Kryvorizhstal cases, Yushchenko is not making any bold statements about [former Donetsk Rada Chairman] Kolesnikov. Some sources allege that Kolesnikov was arrested on Yushchenko’s consent. According to others, Yushchenko has recently ordered [Prosecutor General] Piskun find a way to release Kolesnikov. Yushchenko’s statements about this in his live TV interview sounded a bit too well-weighed. Kolesnikov can be saved by either the investigators’ low professional standards, or the President. If the investigators manage to uncover more facts of Kolesnikov’s illegal activities, the so-called “political expediency” of releasing him may be called into question.

There is little doubt that the financial operations of FC Dynamo Kyiv have been far from transparent. And it is clear that the lawsuit against its president, Grigoriy Surkis, is aimed at weakening his resolve to defend his other assets, in particular, the regional power supply companies.

Surkis likes to quote his own phrase from an interview with The ZN: “Surkis and Medvedchuk are not the same thing”. We are of the same mind, but we wonder why Medvedchuk never even got a slap on the wrist for masterminding the country’s political schism, for the mass media policy during the election campaign (one of the victims was Yushchenko’s mother, who was killed by brazen lies about her son)? Surkis may have had nothing to do with all that, but he never stopped his friend and partner.

We agree with the half of respondents who were negative on the question about the President’s intervention into the Dynamo case.

Yulia Tymoshenko said in an interview with The ZN that “culture is an area under the President’s patronage”. We are witnessing different changes in this area - positive, negative, and inexplicably strange. The public has been agitated and concerned over the dismissal of Mikhail Reznikovich, the director of the Lesya Ukrainka Russian Drama Theater, and the possible resignation of Ivan Franko Theater (director?) Bogdan Stupka, the ex-Minister of Culture in the Yanukovych government and Yushchenko’s proxy in the presidential campaign. The President was surely in the know, but he never made any public statements on this matter. There may be different attitudes to Reznikovich and Stupka, but we agree with the 47 percent of respondents, who believe that the President should intervene.

Finally, we should note the President’s closer attention of late to the Security Service, the Interior Ministry, and the Prosecutor General’s Office. Judging from the tongue-lashing their heads got from him this week, he must have arrived at the same conclusion as his predecessor did: law enforcement is the buttress of the throne. If this buttress supports efforts to defend the national interests, there is nothing bad about it. But if it supports narrow political or personal interests, then it profanes all democratic ideas and aspirations. There are no grounds to suspect Yushchenko of using his powers for any selfish purposes. He decided to head the commission on defense reform, which looks logical for the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. But he must understand that it is also necessary to reform the structures to which the Armed Forces are subordinated. Hopefully, he remembers the mistakes made by Kuchma, and is not going to follow suit.

II. The Prime Minister

After the first hundred days of Yulia Tymoshenko’s premiership it is possible to draw some conclusions about her style, methods, and objectives.

Number one, she came to the Cabinet of Ministers without her team. She only managed to get Alexander Turchinov appointed SBU Chief and Yuri Syvulsky appointed Chief of the Auditing and Inspection Commission at the Cabinet of Ministers. And there is Cabinet Minister Petro Kupko, who works closely with her. But he is not her political partner.

Tymoshenko is trying to create team-like relationships with the staff appointed by the President. She basically relies on Tomenko, Pynzenyk, and Teryokhin, members of the Reforms and Order Party [now renamed “Our Ukraine”]. There are two reasons. Firstly, the OU is at loggerheads with the founders of the People’s Union “Our Ukraine”, who occupy top positions close to the President and offer the OU a poor choice: either to join the PUOU or to remain on the political outskirts like Yuri Kostenko’s party. Besides, if Tymoshenko aligns herself with Yushchenko’s political force in the parliamentary race, the OU could hope to use a part of Tymoshenko’s representation quota.

The second reason is that Tymoshenko’s position binds her to the economic ministers. Tymoshenko, [Finance Minister] Pynzenyk, and [Economy Minister] Teryokhin make a solid trio, adopting practically all decisions unanimously. This is good on the one hand. But on the other, such unanimity without alternative ideas is like Asian cuisine without spices. There are other people in the executive and judiciary branches whose views and ideas deserve the Prime Minister’s systematic, not formal attention…

Tymoshenko has not once left Kyiv throughout this time. Her contacts with the administrative regions via phone and video conference can not give a real picture of life in the country. This seclusion has no logical explanation.

She is on different terms with other ministers. Her relations with Roman Zvarych and [Transport Minister] Yevhen Chervonenko are very problematic because of ideological differences. Her difficult relations with the Agriculture Policy Minister [Alexander Baranivsky] have a simple explanation: these people come from different worlds. Tymoshenko regards [First Vice Prime Minister] Anatoliy Kinakh as Poroshenko’s emissary to the Cabinet and never looks his way. She is somewhat cautious and icy toward [Emergencies Minister] David Zhvania, but the causes of this are rooted in the distant past.

As to the rest of the Cabinet, Tymoshenko maintains decorous, business-like relations with them. She delegates as much to them as possible, even reducing her own formal scope. She needs results and she needs to show them to the people. She encourages her ministers towards independent public relations, and demands maximum transparency.

Secondly, Tymoshenko works for herself, not for material gain. Her salary is big enough, and money for political activities will come from those who owe her, i.e. the businessmen who picked apart her once powerful empire, the Integrated Energy Systems of Ukraine, while she was vulnerable as an opposition leader.

Tymoshenko does not mean to stand by, having achieved unprecedented progress in terms of popularity. For the five years until she became Prime Minister all statistical surveys had showed a stable 50 percent of the population expressing distrust in her. Only Kuchma had more negative ratings. Now, 55 percent support and generally approve of her activity. Task number one for her today is to keep this level of voters’ trust. She needs it to carry out her ambitious plans in the future. She understands that the only way to keep her high popularity rating is to work tangibly for the people. So working for the people, she works for herself.

Tymoshenko works hard. At least she is productive. Her approaches and methods may not seem right, but at least she is doing something. Regrettably, the President is not. And those top officials who are supposed to pave the way for his initiatives only fan his jealousy of the popular prime minister.

To Yushchenko’s credit, his utterances about the Cabinet and the Prime Minister have been more than loyal. However, he seldom gives the government any practical support. Tymoshenko has to act by herself where the President’s backup would be very handy. This primarily concerns interactions with the Parliament. First Vice Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh, who is responsible for contacts with the Parliament, often assumes a position perpendicular to Tymoshenko’s. His faction turns down the Cabinet’s key draft bills and his party [of industrialists and entrepreneurs] publicly and loudly criticizes the government. She finds herself alone whenever she has to muster the minimum 226 votes. The President never lifted a finger in critical situations such as when border-crossing points were jammed with traffic and the government’s program “Stop Contraband!” and new customs tariffs had to be urgently formalized through legislative acts.

If the President had only discussed the situation with the Speaker, the problem would have been lifted. But he must have thought it beneath him. Hopefully, the President will revise his role in the lawmaking process and have his weighty say when the Parliament votes for the bill on intellectual property rights. Then everyone will see whether Yushchenko does not want to help the government or does not want to expose the lawmakers’ reluctance to reckon with his opinion.

Thirdly, the 100 days of peacetime have demonstrated that Tymoshenko’s and Yushchenko’s views differ. Yushchenko is a proponent of the free market. Tymoshenko is in favour of the government’s dominating role in the country’s economy. She has an evidently strong bent for manual control. She explained that “manual control is necessary at the stage when we are turning chaos into a system”, but too many observers have the impression that there is too much manual control. She wraps her hard-line policy in amicable manners and explains her unpopular decisions with a smile. Very few are clever enough to see through the wrapping. All the rest swallow them, even if there is nothing inside.

The number of respondents who negatively assess the Prime Minister’s and the President’s performance is nearly equal: 16.5 percent. But the number of respondents who appraise Tymoshenko’s performance positively is a little bigger: 55.3 percent vs. 50.2 percent for Yushchenko. There may be several reasons why the people’s attitude to these two differs significantly in different regions of the country. Number one, it is not Tymoshenko but Yushchenko who was the antagonist and rival of Viktor Yanukovych during the presidential race, in which Yanukovych enjoyed strong support. The former authorities worked hard and long to forge Tymoshenko’s image as a kleptomaniac. And Yushchenko was painted as “Uncle Sam’s henchman”, an “anti-Russia demon”, and an “arrogant Ukrainian bourgeois nationalist”.

Reason number two is the different lines of conduct Tymoshenko and Yushchenko chose. Tymoshenko put on an orange T-shirt from the Donetsk Shakhtar soccer club and held up under the crossfire of hostile questions in the live 100-minute TV interview on the Donetsk channel. She stood her ground and smiled. She wanted to be liked. She talked of love, friendship, and unity. And when Yushchenko visited the same region, he behaved extremely rigidly. The deliberations he held with local executive officials left an unforgettable impression. It is not our right to judge who was right and who was wrong. Perhaps the TV viewers deserved what they saw, and the corrupt public servants deserved what they heard. But the local population preferred the one who was “kinder”.

Number three, voters in the East and South of Ukraine supported the previous government so wholeheartedly because it increased their salaries, pensions, and other social allowances. Now, having received higher salaries and pensions from the new government, some of them have changed their attitude. But they obviously associate their higher incomes with the Prime Minister’s, not the President’s work. Of course, the Tymoshenko government works in line with the President’s program and promises, but most Ukrainians overlook this fact.

III. Members of the Government,

The Presidential Secretariat Chief, NSDC Secretary

Statistical figures show a significant difference between the appraisal of the President’s and the Prime Minister’s performance on the one hand and their team’s performance on the other. Most Ukrainians are still uncertain about the executive authorities’ capabilities and practical work.

There are only six or seven persons who are known well enough to be evaluated. The best-known are Anatoliy Kinakh, Petro Poroshenko, [Interior Minister] Yuri Lutsenko, Alexander Zinchenko, [Culture Minister] Oksana Bilozir, and Mykola Tomenko.

First Vice Prime Minister Anatoliy Kinakh stands out, with 52.3 percent of respondents evaluating his performance positively. This figure must make him happy: he is about to launch his own pre-election project in a “joint venture” of almost three dozen political parties. This figure must make him optimistic after his crushing defeat in the presidential race last fall, in which he collected a mere 0.93 percent of votes.

Kinakh doesn’t mind that in most cases his opinion remains unsupported by his colleagues. Popular support and trust are more important to him. He is well-known, owing to his position as First Vice Premier. He often appears on TV, mostly with critical utterances about the government. Seeing his composure and imperturbable face, the people believe that this is what a real government official must look like. He produces the impression of a solid statesman, which adds to this government’s positive balance of popularity.

Petro Poroshenko is also widely known. He has appeared rarely on TV and in electronic media of late. But the people remember him very well as the chairman of the budget committee and an active figure during the Orange Revolution. Slightly more than a quarter of respondents assess his performance positively - a good result. But nearly as many people assess it negatively. The positive balance is rather modest, a mere 1.5 percent.

The balance of his potential ability to improve the situation in the country is unexpectedly negative. Poroshenko is energetic and eloquent, and his argumentation is clear and comprehensible. In the capacity of NSDC Secretary he has visited Iraq and Moscow - that is not enough for generalized judgments. So why is every fourth citizen of Ukraine so suspicious of him?

One of the reasons could be the general public attitude to successful businessmen. But the attitude to him is far more negative than to Chervonenko and Zhvania, who were also successful businessmen before they became ministers.

In fact, the explanation is very simple: the President publicly admitted to a conflict between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko. A man who clashes with a woman always looks “unfavorable” in the public eye. Moreover, if she is a darling of the people and is good-looking too, her male counterpart has no chance at all. Poroshenko hardly cares, knowing that in his position he may as well do without publicity and popular support. But the President ought to be alarmed. If the worst predictions come true and a conflict between the President and the Prime Minister breaks out one day, Yushchenko should think well about the imminent impact of his breakup with Tymoshenko on his own popularity rating.

Yuriy Lutsenko is the public’s favourite. No other Minister of the Interior has ever been so popular. Society pins great hopes onto Yuriy Lutsenko. People believe he is capable of changing the situation for the better, and praise his activities. He has the second-best rating after Anatoliy Kinakh. People appreciate his wits, energy, decisiveness, daring disposition and his manner of speaking plain Ukrainian. People also approve of his actions, namely of his calling to account former officials that abused their power. Lutsenko’s popularity reflects the public’s expectations that the mighty of the world who scorned the law will pay for it. It is amazing, though, that the people in the street do not seem to support his ministry’s specific initiatives.

Thus, a little more than half of respondents agree with the attempts to send additional police forces to the regions with the highest crime level. Our compatriots do not pay much attention to the police statistics indicating that the criminal situation in these regions improves only temporarily while the assigned contingent is there and local mobsters are squeezed, at least for the time being, to the neighbouring regions. As few as 36% of respondents support a naive initiative whereby all police officers and their family members are required to declare their incomes. Nor do they think highly of the project to abolish all “privileged” license plates, reducing the police by one third and dissolving checkpoints on the administrative borders of big cities.

Olexander Zinchenko’s rating is also fairly high: the people remember him from his “previous life” and by his democratic reincarnation. Olexander Zinchenko’s popularity can partly be attributed to his constant presence in President Yushchenko’s background.

As for the Minister of Finance, Ukrainians have known him for quite a while and in different capacities. Some time ago the public opinion associated him with the so-called “voucher privatization”. However, according to the survey, Viktor Pinzenyk has managed to break the stereotype: 27% of respondents assess his activities positively and 17.5% negatively, with a considerable balance of 9.5%. Every fourth Ukrainian is positive the Minister will be able to improve the situation, while 17% doubt it. Of course, the Finance Minister should have had a better trust rating, but for a man whose name was perceived as a synonym of lost savings, crushed trusts and hyperinflation of the 1990s, the result is not that bad, after all.

Minister of the Economy Serhiy Teriokhin is less known to the population. In spite of his frequent appearance on various TV channels, and his remarkable looks, only 21% of Ukrainians say they have a general idea of what Serhiy Teriokhin does in the government. In fact, he does a lot, and the Prime Minister has defined his ministry as a key one. Yet people judge the performance of the government’s economic sector by the economic situation that they observe in their everyday life. The surveyors asked a series of questions regarding the government’s latest economic initiatives and the impact they had on people’s wellbeing. It transpired that the Tymoshenko government’s economic policy and practice so far have not improved the financial situation of 48.7% of respondents (vs 22.9% of those whose situation has become slightly better and 3.7% of those whose welfare has improved dramatically). There could be several reasons for this. First, the new authorities’ pre- and post-election promises and commitments were excessively lavish. Second, not all of the people eligible could have received higher salaries and pensions by the time of the survey, and were thus unable to react adequately to the government’s endeavours. Third, recently every Ukrainian, irrespective of his or her incomes, has been concerned about growing inflation. There is an imminent threat that the continuing price rise could “eat up” all social payments and increments in salaries and pensions, no matter how hard the government might try to raise them. Prices for most, if not all, foodstuffs, consumer goods and services have gone up: meat and dairy products, petrol, railway fare, even … for forty days’ prayer for the dead in some churches. This increased cost of living affects the age group of 40-60 years. These are the people who have not yet reached the peak of their careers, and whose children are university students with no stable source of income. The new government’s initiatives have actually ignored this age group. Most of them are too old to become eligible for extra high maternity benefits and too young to receive increased pensions.

Responses concerning the Cabinet’s economic performance are controversial. On the one hand, nearly all of the population commend it for raising salaries and pensions (which entails huge budget expenses); on the other, people seem unsupportive of the government’s steps aiming to secure budget revenues, such as the revision of import duties or eliminating privileges for free economic zones (only every fifth Ukrainian is in favour of the latter).

Analysts in the Cabinet of Ministers and National Bank should be aware that despite their efforts to promote the national currency revaluation as a breakthrough and an exceptional benefit for the nation, the people’s attitude to this measure is skeptical, to put it mildly. Even if the NBU had valorized the Ukrainian currency gradually to 5.1 UAH per 1 USD by the end of the year, only 33.7% of the population would have welcomed this development, since the American dollar is the traditional currency of savings in the country.

Another disturbing indicator is the change in the small and medium business’ attitude to the authorities’ decisions. Where 55% of entrepreneurs are sympathetic to Viktor Yushchenko’s initiatives (including social, humanitarian and anti-corruption) only 33% of them agree with the government’s decisions that have a direct impact on their business. Another 48% of small and medium entrepreneurs say the business environment has not changed at all. This should worry the Cabinet members who have been carried away with social programmes but underrated the need for a balanced and systemic framework for deregulation, support of small and medium business, and relief of the tax burden.

Respondents know Minister of Culture and Tourism Oksana Bilozir very well, which is natural for the pop singer that she is. Vice Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko, though falling behind her in popularity, is also easily recognizable. He earned his fame on Maidan during the revolution. We acknowledge that. He also appeared on TV screens every other day of the government’s one hundred days, with comments on any occasion, ranging from the oligarchs’ sabotage to re-privatization, from the oil crisis to oil re-export by Minister Zvarych’s wife. As a result, 47.4% of respondents are well informed about the Vice Prime Minister’s activities. His balance of positive and negative assessments is also good - 10.8%. However, the balance of those who believe in Tomenko’s capacity to change the situation for the better and those who do not is quite modest at 6.2%.

Among others, we asked our respondents about their attitude to the initiatives by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. About 43.5% of them approved of the idea to support pop music development. The Minister communicated this idea at the very start of her activities, at a meeting with musicians and producers. Mykola Tomenko went even farther and provided practical support, as most of you will remember, to the group he preferred to the other participants in the national tour of the Eurovision 2005 song contest. Another initiative by the Ministry did not go over so well with the public: only 17.4% of respondents approve of the new regulations on concert tours and guest performances by domestic and foreign musicians and theatre groups.

The level of people’s satisfaction with state control in the field of culture proved to be higher that expected. Isn’t it amazing that about 39% of respondents would back up the idea of introducing state regulation in the film industry? We are sure that most of them enjoy American and European movies but are unaware that in both North America and Europe the state has waived any control of the industry in favour of private business.

Yet generally speaking, our citizens are not sure the state should support the popular music and cinema industries. None of the respective projects proposed by the Minister of Culture and Vice Prime Minister for Humanitarian Affairs got 50% of the popular vote. It could mean that Ukrainians prefer to see these spheres developing as independent industries rather than being financed from the state budget, i.e. at the expense of taxes they pay: over 25% of respondents would not support any of the above projects. Whereas the President seems to care about historical aspects of Ukraine’s humanitarian development, somebody should think about its future, design and support modern projects and programmes. Will the Ministry of Culture do that?

The public’s expectations and concerns with regard to the new government were diverse, pertaining to many aspects of social life, including its Ukrainization: 51% of the adult population admitted having such expectations, while 49% did not. In Western Ukraine this indicator was the highest at 63.7%; in the other regions 46-48% of respondents said they expected the government and local authorities to support Ukrainization or even to impose it on them. Did those expectations and concerns come true? Opinions differ: 38.1% of respondents amongst those who had such expectations and concerns believe the new authorities actively promote Ukrainization, another 38.1% think the government does it less vigorously than they expected, and 8.6% consider that the government, contrary to their expectations, does not do anything to encourage Ukrainization. Tomenko and Bilozir’s policy in this sphere is fairly tolerant.

The survey that ZN commissioned to Kyiv International Institute of Sociology was completed at the end of April. At that time, the scandal around Minister of Justice Roman Zvarych’s University decree (or, rather, lack thereof) was brewing in the Internet media outlets. It splashed out into the printed media a bit later. Yet the public knew the Justice Minister well anyway: about 38% of respondents stated they were informed of his activities. Based on that information, 14.5% assessed his work positively and 12% negatively, the balance being 2.4%. Given a relatively high recognition rate, the Minister’s low balance is a worrying signal. The positive balance of opinions about the Minister’s ability to improve the situation is lower still - 0.1%. It is the rare case when the public sentiment and experts’ opinions coincide.

Vice Prime Minister Roman Bezsmertny shied away from TV cameras during the election campaign. Nevertheless, the people recognize him easily and think they know what kind of responsibilities he has in the Cabinet, even though his area of specialization - administrative and territorial reform - is obscure to the general public. About 13% of respondents assess his activities positively, and 8% negatively. Frankly speaking, even experts in the area would have difficulty assessing his performance, since the reform he is in charge of is a centerpiece of clashing interests and opposing influences. Many would be of two minds as to which of the latest developments can be accredited to Bezsmertny’s hard work, and which to his capitulation in the face of mightier players. Few respondents believe in his ability to cope with the tasks entrusted to him, the positive balance being 1.1%. This might pose a problem for such a public figure as Roman Bezsmertny, particularly in view of his role in Yushchenko’s new party requiring that he be popular with the voters. However, he still has enough time to remedy the situation.

Minister of Transport and Communications Yevhen Chervonenko was one of the first Cabinet members to appear on all TV channels at once. Having stayed in his office for seven days and nights, he told millions of TV viewers about the situation in his ministry and shared his plans for reforming it. The Minister never forgets about the media. Therefore about 30% of the population believe they are well informed about his activities. We wish we could be amongst them. 12,3% of respondents support his actions and 7.4% assess them negatively. The balance of opinions in favour of his ability to improve the situation is 2.5%. Given his intensive self-promotion campaign, the result is not inspiring. Now Minister Chervonenko should be expected to expand his presence in the media, boost budget revenues coming from his ministry and make the public like him more.

Foreign Minister Borys Tarasiuk is not a novice to public politics. The KIIS sociologists maintain that respondents tend to assess positively those ministers whom they know by sight. Many recognize Borys Tarasiuk, but only 28.3% believe they are well informed of his activities. In part, the reason is that citizens in any country are less interested in foreign policy that in domestic issues. And yet, the Foreign Ministry’s press service should be concerned about its own efficiency. As for the Minister, about 15% of those surveyed assess his performance positively and about 5% negatively. Taken separately, the figures do not seem impressive, but the positive balance is fairly good - 9.9%. Moreover, about 13% believe he can change the situation for the better and only 4.5% doubt it. Thus, Borys Tarasiuk, despite his long history in public politics, remains an enigma for the majority of our compatriots.

His activities, however, are dynamic, diverse and, for the most part, professional. The ministry employees complain but do not quit, contrary to what many analysts predicted. Key experts have stayed with the ministry, for different reasons. First, they have got used to working with Tarasiuk. Second, current challenges that the ministry faces have whet their professional interest. Third, they cherish dreams connected to a forthcoming rotation of the ambassadorial corps of the ministry.

Vice Prime Minister for European Integration Oleh Rybachuk is not so successful. This lack of progress should not be blamed on him but, rather, on a declared, instead of genuine, desire by the country’s leadership to integrate into European structures and organizations. The major newsmaker during the revolution, Oleh Rybachuk has almost disappeared from TV screens. According to the ZN sources, the Vice Prime Minister has met with the President only once. Given his close relations with Viktor Yushchenko, we supposed he would be the President’s vigilante in the Cabinet. However, the President has assigned this role to other people, while many of Rybachuk’s initiatives have been either nipped in the bud or shelved. He proposed reorganizing the Cabinet to meet European standards but the proposal was turned down. He suggested that every minister should have a deputy in charge of European integration issues but his colleagues did not second the move. He wanted to set up a state committee for European integration but nobody agreed…

Nonetheless, foreign policy is one of the President’s top priorities. So how does the public assess the country’s accomplishments in this field in the administration’s one hundred days in office? No surprises here. As before, residents of the western regions approve of closer ties with the West, whereas those in the eastern regions are more enthusiastic about cooperating with Russia. It is noteworthy, however, that respondents in the southern oblasts of Ukraine share opinions with their compatriots in the central, rather than in the eastern parts of the country.

First and foremost, we were interested to learn what people think of the relations with Ukraine’s main strategic partners: Russia, the USA and the EU.

According to the survey, 38.1% of respondents believe the new administration “aspires to develop equitable and friendly relations with Russia”. Figures differ in different regions: 52.5% of the population in the western, regions, 49% - in the central regions, 32.4% in the south and only 16.9% in the east of the country regard Ukraine’s policy towards the Russian Federation as friendly. At the same time, 33.6% of residents in the east, 22.5% in the south, about 7% in the west and centre of the country tag our foreign policy as “anti-Russian”. On average, 17.3% of Ukrainians think Kyiv is hostile towards Moscow. Another 33.5% are of the opinion that “the government lacks a clear and consistent policy with regard to Russia”.

The survey demonstrated that the overwhelming majority of our citizens are familiar with the new team’s policy towards the USA: as few as 3.5% of respondents could not, or would not, assess it. The rest fell into three approximately equal groups. Thus, 32.4% consider it to be “mostly positive”, which points out to a remarkable progress as compared with the “pre-revolution times” when as few as 3-5% of Ukrainians opted for building up trust and intensifying relations with the United States. Today, even in the eastern regions of the country 16.8% of respondents support this policy. The main reasons for such a miraculous transformation of public sentiment are President Yushchenko’s triumphant visit to the USA and the obvious change in the US leadership’s attitude to Ukraine.

Another 31.7% of Ukraine’s population is critical of the government’s policy towards America. In the east of the country this indicator is as high as 57.6%. In the southern oblasts, negative opinions also prevail over positive (39.7% vs 24.1%). In the western and central parts of the country people tend to welcome new developments in Ukrainian-American relations rather than to censure them (respectively, 51% vs 11.5% in the west and 38.6% vs 21.1% in the centre).

The rest 32.4% of respondents found it difficult to assess the administration’s policy towards the USA in an unambiguous fashion.

When asked about the new opportunities that our strategic partnership with the USA could open up, the surveyed chose the following answers:

“Improved Ukraine’s international image and influence” - 38.7% agreed and 37.3% disagreed; “Increased investments in Ukraine’s economy” - 39.3% agreed and 27.5% disagreed; “Dependence on the sole world power disguised under attractive declarations about equal partnership” - 49.9% agreed, 25.7% disagreed and 24.4% had no opinion whatever.

Responses to the question: “Do you agree that Ukraine will never be offered an EU membership no matter what it could do and what level of development it could achieve?” came as a pleasant surprise to experts and journalists. About half Ukrainians (48.6%) are optimistic about the country’s future in the EU family of nations. Insistent statements by the previous top officials that “they do not want us in Europe,” accompanied by a chorus of similar assurances from Moscow, and Brussels’ wariness about Ukraine’s plans for the European integration have not shaken these optimists’ confidence that sooner or later their country will accede to the EU. In all regions, except the east, optimists outnumbered pessimists (23.1% on average for the country). The other 28.3% were undecided on this score.

Most respondents (66.2%) understand that “Ukraine’s new leaders enjoy a greater trust amongst the EU leaders than the previous administration”. Even in the eastern regions 53.2% of those surveyed had to admit it.

Our compatriots’ optimism about Ukraine’s EU prospects could be attributed to the fact that 56.2% of them believe the new administration will “make serious steps towards Ukraine’s rapprochement with Europe”. And again, it is only in the east that those who disagree with the statement outnumber, albeit by as little as 2.3%, those who agree with it.

At the same time, 22.2% of those surveyed did not notice any real “steps towards Europe”: most of them (68.4%) think “European integration is nothing but loud declarations”. It appears that the closer people are to Europe (in geographic terms), the more visible such “real steps” are to them: 70% of residents in the west of the country say they have noticed advancements in this direction, while in the east only 36.8% would agree with them.

Ukrainians seem even more aware of the new administration’s intent “to gradually bring Ukraine to meet NATO standards”: 57.5% of respondents hold this opinion of the new team’s policy towards the alliance. However, 21.9% of the population have no opinion on this matter; the other 20.6% argue the government has “neither developed a sound policy regarding NATO nor made a clear statement about Ukraine’s plans to join it”.

The level of support of NATO membership remains low, as 39% of the population insist it will “run counter to Ukraine’s national interests”. Regionally, 72.5% of respondents in the east, 45.2% in the south, 28.1% in the centre and 12.1% in the west oppose the idea of NATO membership for Ukraine. As of today, only 21.3% of our citizens believe that accession to NATO would expedite the country’s national interests. Even in the west, only 38.2% of respondents voiced their pro-NATO sentiment, let alone east and south with their respective 4.9% and 4.2%. Last year’s wild anti-NATO campaign unleashed by the previous administration has had an effect equal to that of the NATO bombardment of the former Yugoslavia back in 1999 when the share of NATO supporters in Ukraine was well below 20%.

This time, however, prospects for the government’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations seem more inviting: according to another survey conducted by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and KIIS in February, even fewer Ukrainians (15%) favoured the country’s accession to NATO then. Within two months, in the absence of any noticeable promotional effort on its part (with the single exception of President Yushchenko’s moving speech at the NATO summit), the new administration managed to win to its side another 5% of NATO enthusiasts. Of course, it is still a far cry from the 40% registered in 2002, but the potential is there (especially in the western and central oblasts): 28.3% of the population is hesitant (those people believe NATO accession to be only partly in accord with our national interests), and 11.4% have not formed an opinion about it. Should the government design a wise information and education campaign, tailor it to the needs of each region and conduct it quickly, it can raise the level of popular support to Ukraine’s membership in NATO, debunk old myths, cure numerous phobias and eliminate prejudices.

As for eastward integration with the former Soviet republics, society seems equally rifted. Only 28.3% of respondents approve of the new government’s “attempts to reduce Ukraine’s participation in the Common Economic Space to the free trade zone”, while 39.4% disapprove of them, particularly in the east and south of the country (67.4% and 45%, respectively). Most people in the latter category (88.6%) feel apprehensive about a possible “deterioration in Ukraine’s relations with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan”. Only 5.2% are displeased with Kyiv’s current policy towards the CES because, in their opinion, Ukraine should “quit this formation for good” (even in the west, only 18.4% of respondents support Ukraine’s severance from CES). Another 32.3% partly approve and partly disapprove of Ukraine’s limiting its involvement with CES.

As demonstrated by the survey, 37.8% of respondents support the new administration’s plans to use the NIS mechanisms only as an “additional opportunity for developing bilateral relations with its member-countries”. Another 39.6% of Ukrainians (especially in the eastern and southern oblasts) reject this policy as unwise: they are convinced that Ukraine “should have closer ties with the NIS countries”. Only 4.9% of respondents claim Ukraine should withdraw from this post-Soviet alliance (9% in the west, 6.1% in the east, 3.7% in the south and 1.7% in the centre). Thus, despite the optimism of half of Ukraine’s population about its European future, most Ukrainians also want to maintain friendly relations with the former Soviet republics.

In the early days of May, Minister of Defense Anatoliy Gritsenko created many occasions for the mass media to feature him in their publications: an official visit to Moscow, an inspection tour of the Crimea and the addressing of outstanding military issues relating to the Black Sea Fleet, Victory Day festivities, discussion of the causes of the munitions storage explosion in Khmelnytsky oblast… Previously, he was seldom seen on TV channels. Nevertheless, about 25% of respondents believe they understand what he does as a minister. 12.3 % of those surveyed assess his performance positively and 3.5% negatively, the balance being 8.8%. The balance of opinions in favour of his ability to cope with the tasks assigned to him is 8.7%.

Ukrainian society traditionally places its confidence in the military and cares about its successes and failures. That is why the Ministry of Defense was included in the list of agencies whose performance and initiatives were assessed not only by experts but by the general public as well.

Understandably, some of the processes underway in the ministry are beyond the laymen’s grasp or interest. Thus, the personnel rotation in the ministry’s top management has been almost completed, an entirely new procedure for housing provision to servicemen has been developed, garrison service routines have been revised, military threats have been re-assessed, more realistic target indicators have been established for the composition and strength of combat units in the mid-term perspective, etc. At the same time, people in the street are in a position to assess other projects currently implemented by the ministry. For example, 62.8 % of respondents support the plans to professionalize the force by 2010. This is the third most popular of the Cabinet’s initiatives after raising pensions and salaries and cutting prices for some medicines. In other words, the people welcome the abolition of universal military service of the Soviet type.

The majority of those surveyed (58.4%) are in favour of reducing the term of military service to twelve months. This majority comprises recruits, their parents, grandparent and girl-friends, all of whom applaud the realization of Viktor Yushchenko’s election commitments. The next survey outcome surprised us: only 44% of respondents approve of the three-fold increase in the soldiers’ allowance. It is common knowledge that called into the draft are, predominantly, young men from needy families who cannot muster a sufficient amount of money to bribe local enlistment officers. We felt ashamed of our fellow citizens who begrudged young soldiers their allowance increase from UAH 20 to UAH 60 per month.

The ministry’s initiative to optimize the military education-and-research system and to close down redundant military academies did not go well with the general public: only 17% support it. It is clear, however, that the ministry will have to resort to this unpopular measure, since the force reduction will inevitably necessitate a decrease in the number of military schools. Today, some of them have a student/teacher ratio two to three times as high as in civilian universities, and the total number of employees in the high military education system exceeds 32,000 people. 7.4% of respondents turn their thumbs down to all four of the above initiatives. As for the military officers and generals, most of them think highly of their civilian minister: after a brief period of commotion and excitement, he loaded all of them with responsible and meaningful work. The minister himself thinks his performance so far has been fairly good.

Yuriy Lutsenko is the public’s favourite. No other Minister of the Interior has ever been so popular. Society pins great hopes onto Yuriy Lutsenko. People believe he is capable of changing the situation for the better, and praise his activities. He has the second-best rating after Anatoliy Kinakh. People appreciate his wits, energy, decisiveness, daring disposition and his manner of speaking plain Ukrainian. People also approve of his actions, namely of his calling to account former officials that abused their power. Lutsenko’s popularity reflects the public’s expectations that the mighty of the world who scorned the law will pay for it. It is amazing, though, that the people in the street do not seem to support his ministry’s specific initiatives.

Thus, a little more than half of respondents agree with the attempts to send additional police forces to the regions with the highest crime level. Our compatriots do not pay much attention to the police statistics indicating that the criminal situation in these regions improves only temporarily while the assigned contingent is there and local mobsters are squeezed, at least for the time being, to the neighbouring regions. As few as 36% of respondents support a naive initiative whereby all police officers and their family members are required to declare their incomes. Nor do they think highly of the project to abolish all “privileged” license plates, reducing the police by one third and dissolving checkpoints on the administrative borders of big cities.

Olexander Zinchenko’s rating is also fairly high: the people remember him from his “previous life” and by his democratic reincarnation. Olexander Zinchenko’s popularity can partly be attributed to his constant presence in President Yushchenko’s background.

As for the Minister of Finance, Ukrainians have known him for quite a while and in different capacities. Some time ago the public opinion associated him with the so-called “voucher privatization”. However, according to the survey, Viktor Pinzenyk has managed to break the stereotype: 27% of respondents assess his activities positively and 17.5% negatively, with a considerable balance of 9.5%. Every fourth Ukrainian is positive the Minister will be able to improve the situation, while 17% doubt it. Of course, the Finance Minister should have had a better trust rating, but for a man whose name was perceived as a synonym of lost savings, crushed trusts and hyperinflation of the 1990s, the result is not that bad, after all.

Minister of the Economy Serhiy Teriokhin is less known to the population. In spite of his frequent appearance on various TV channels, and his remarkable looks, only 21% of Ukrainians say they have a general idea of what Serhiy Teriokhin does in the government. In fact, he does a lot, and the Prime Minister has defined his ministry as a key one. Yet people judge the performance of the government’s economic sector by the economic situation that they observe in their everyday life. The surveyors asked a series of questions regarding the government’s latest economic initiatives and the impact they had on people’s wellbeing. It transpired that the Tymoshenko government’s economic policy and practice so far have not improved the financial situation of 48.7% of respondents (vs 22.9% of those whose situation has become slightly better and 3.7% of those whose welfare has improved dramatically). There could be several reasons for this. First, the new authorities’ pre- and post-election promises and commitments were excessively lavish. Second, not all of the people eligible could have received higher salaries and pensions by the time of the survey, and were thus unable to react adequately to the government’s endeavours. Third, recently every Ukrainian, irrespective of his or her incomes, has been concerned about growing inflation. There is an imminent threat that the continuing price rise could “eat up” all social payments and increments in salaries and pensions, no matter how hard the government might try to raise them. Prices for most, if not all, foodstuffs, consumer goods and services have gone up: meat and dairy products, petrol, railway fare, even … for forty days’ prayer for the dead in some churches. This increased cost of living affects the age group of 40-60 years. These are the people who have not yet reached the peak of their careers, and whose children are university students with no stable source of income. The new government’s initiatives have actually ignored this age group. Most of them are too old to become eligible for extra high maternity benefits and too young to receive increased pensions.

Responses concerning the Cabinet’s economic performance are controversial. On the one hand, nearly all of the population commend it for raising salaries and pensions (which entails huge budget expenses); on the other, people seem unsupportive of the government’s steps aiming to secure budget revenues, such as the revision of import duties or eliminating privileges for free economic zones (only every fifth Ukrainian is in favour of the latter).

Analysts in the Cabinet of Ministers and National Bank should be aware that despite their efforts to promote the national currency revaluation as a breakthrough and an exceptional benefit for the nation, the people’s attitude to this measure is skeptical, to put it mildly. Even if the NBU had valorized the Ukrainian currency gradually to 5.1 UAH per 1 USD by the end of the year, only 33.7% of the population would have welcomed this development, since the American dollar is the traditional currency of savings in the country.

Another disturbing indicator is the change in the small and medium business’ attitude to the authorities’ decisions. Where 55% of entrepreneurs are sympathetic to Viktor Yushchenko’s initiatives (including social, humanitarian and anti-corruption) only 33% of them agree with the government’s decisions that have a direct impact on their business. Another 48% of small and medium entrepreneurs say the business environment has not changed at all. This should worry the Cabinet members who have been carried away with social programmes but underrated the need for a balanced and systemic framework for deregulation, support of small and medium business, and relief of the tax burden.

Respondents know Minister of Culture and Tourism Oksana Bilozir very well, which is natural for the pop singer that she is. Vice Prime Minister Mykola Tomenko, though falling behind her in popularity, is also easily recognizable. He earned his fame on Maidan during the revolution. We acknowledge that. He also appeared on TV screens every other day of the government’s one hundred days, with comments on any occasion, ranging from the oligarchs’ sabotage to re-privatization, from the oil crisis to oil re-export by Minister Zvarych’s wife. As a result, 47.4% of respondents are well informed about the Vice Prime Minister’s activities. His balance of positive and negative assessments is also good - 10.8%. However, the balance of those who believe in Tomenko’s capacity to change the situation for the better and those who do not is quite modest at 6.2%.

Among others, we asked our respondents about their attitude to the initiatives by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism. About 43.5% of them approved of the idea to support pop music development. The Minister communicated this idea at the very start of her activities, at a meeting with musicians and producers. Mykola Tomenko went even farther and provided practical support, as most of you will remember, to the group he preferred to the other participants in the national tour of the Eurovision 2005 song contest. Another initiative by the Ministry did not go over so well with the public: only 17.4% of respondents approve of the new regulations on concert tours and guest performances by domestic and foreign musicians and theatre groups.

The level of people’s satisfaction with state control in the field of culture proved to be higher that expected. Isn’t it amazing that about 39% of respondents would back up the idea of introducing state regulation in the film industry? We are sure that most of them enjoy American and European movies but are unaware that in both North America and Europe the state has waived any control of the industry in favour of private business.

Yet generally speaking, our citizens are not sure the state should support the popular music and cinema industries. None of the respective projects proposed by the Minister of Culture and Vice Prime Minister for Humanitarian Affairs got 50% of the popular vote. It could mean that Ukrainians prefer to see these spheres developing as independent industries rather than being financed from the state budget, i.e. at the expense of taxes they pay: over 25% of respondents would not support any of the above projects. Whereas the President seems to care about historical aspects of Ukraine’s humanitarian development, somebody should think about its future, design and support modern projects and programmes. Will the Ministry of Culture do that?

The public’s expectations and concerns with regard to the new government were diverse, pertaining to many aspects of social life, including its Ukrainization: 51% of the adult population admitted having such expectations, while 49% did not. In Western Ukraine this indicator was the highest at 63.7%; in the other regions 46-48% of respondents said they expected the government and local authorities to support Ukrainization or even to impose it on them. Did those expectations and concerns come true? Opinions differ: 38.1% of respondents amongst those who had such expectations and concerns believe the new authorities actively promote Ukrainization, another 38.1% think the government does it less vigorously than they expected, and 8.6% consider that the government, c