St Sophia Cathedral. The President and his family are praying. The country is watching them in this intimate act through a television keyhole. I feel embarrassed and switch off the TV set.
The President’s entourage, however, does not feel ill at ease. For most of them, Yushchenko is their God, since he makes major personnel decisions. Therefore they pray to him. The stage in Maidan cannot accommodate all of the zealots, so professional atheists cross themselves in St Sophia, the most foolhardy swim in the Dnipro River on Epiphany, thirty officials accompanying the President in Strasbourg leave the text of the head of state’s speech to be delivered in CEPA at the hotel - all because the most important thing is to be near him, not to let their chance slip by. While demonstrating a lack of unity to the nation and to the world, ordering comments against one another in the domestic and foreign media, pitting various influential groups of Yushchenko’s supporters against one another, all the king’s men are losing their right to be called a team, and to be treated like one.
Such behaviour discredits the politicians involved in the public eye, calls into question the new government’s efficiency, and exasperates the President. The top-level-job seekers should not forget it.
Last week, another essential circumstance was brought to light: President Yushchenko is independent in his decision-making. The appointments announced on Monday caught all his allies, including the new appointees, unawares. Do not believe the experts who say “I knew he would do it”. Nobody did. Yuliya Tymoshenko heard about her prime ministerial nomination on Monday morning as she entered Viktor Yushchenko’s office with [the YT Bloc member] Olexander Turchynov: “I’ve made a decision, you’ll be the Premier. Go and do your job”. That was it.
Olexander Zinchenko was notified of his new position on board the presidential plane heading for Moscow.
Petro Poroshenko learned about being appointed Secretary of the Council for National Security and Defence from journalists.
We will discuss the President’s possible motives in placing these people in their positions a little later. At this juncture, we would like to call your attention to several significant points. First, Viktor Yushchenko is not afraid to appoint strong personalities and skilled politicians to leading posts, which is good. Second, Yushchenko makes his personnel decisions based on his own principles and criteria. Third, his statements in Russia, Strasbourg, Poland and Davos show that he has a comprehensive, strategic vision for the country’s further development, which is indispensable for a head of state.
Yet the question is whether he will be able to set up a system of effective relations, not amongst the abstract positions on his list of staff members, but amongst the real people whom he plans to include in this list. Another question is whether he will be able to get the new presidential team to share his values. I will venture a guess that very few of the post-seekers (whose names have often been mentioned in the media lately) have fully realized want kind of values these are.
All of us have yet to discover President Yushchenko for ourselves. We are yet to know what kind of person he is, and in what way his personal qualities and values are going to affect the entire system of power. Some people think his promises to combat corruption, guarantee independence of the judiciary, put an end to impunity and arbitrariness of uniformed wrongdoers, honour Ukraine’s national interests as his top priority, etc are stories for the Maidan. Some study the President’s face when he says: “Should I hear that you steal - you’ll lose your job in two ticks” and expect him to give a wink. But he does not. Nor does he discuss kick-backs or demand pledges of allegiance. A most unusual President!
We should not blame the post-seekers, though: for ten years they have been living in a country where the above was the norm, the modus vivendi. Moreover, the system of power relied on it. What this system will look like under Yushchenko is still unclear. Leonid Kuchma’s principle was “divide and rule”. To Yushchenko, on the contrary, squabbles inside his team are painful, and should they continue, we may expect new presidential decrees, this time on dismissals.
Some of the abovementioned appointments, particularly Tymoshenko’s and Poroshenko’s, were inherently antagonistic; there is no doubt of that. And this is in conflict with the President’s aspiration to build a cohesive team. He is still trying to pay homage to his staunchest supporters for their contribution to the election campaign. Yet soon the campaign and related services will recede into the background, under the pressures of day-to-day work. Current performance, ability to deliver and future prospects will be appreciated, rather than former merits. Of course, we need a system of checks and balances on the system of power, but it should differ from the model once proposed by a KGB General: “Let us spy on one another, and everything will be fine.”
Poroshenko should not be checking on Tymoshenko, and Zinchenko should not be tracking rule-breaking by the former two. This power is vested in the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Accounting Chamber, the Security Service and the Parliament, where the President has a loyal majority. Besides, there are the media and the opposition. The system of checks and balances works well in a stable state. It is very steady, which is a plus, but at the same time, it is not at all flexible, which is a minus, under the circumstances. What we need today is professionals aptly placed in the right positions. The acting Prime Minister is the only new appointee viewed by the majority as the right person in the right place. The rest will have to prove it every day with their work.
Returning to the new President’s requirements and values, I will assume that where Leonid Kuchma would discharge an official at the slightest hint of his or her contacts with the opposition, Viktor Yushchenko will do that having confirmed data of an official’s involvement in corruption schemes, or embezzlement of budget funds. I will also assume that Yushchenko, the President, is different from Yushchenko, the “Our Ukraine” leader. Those of his team members (especially businessmen) who comprehend and accept it sooner than the others will wind up less psychologically traumatized and with better chances in the future. Those who try to object and remind him of their previous services will run the risk of falling out of favour. Nobody knows what forms that disfavour can take, but it will, certainly, not be Kuchma’s style of harassing the opposition.
It is critical for the country, and particularly for its political elite, to understand the difference between the two presidents. We should not try to fit the new head of state into his predecessor’s stereotypes, methods and approaches. Of course, big politics is impossible without intrigues. Of course, the President will not loosen his grip on the situation in vital political, economic and social spheres. Of course, he will strive to control and monitor the major processes in those spheres, thus intruding into various officials’ purview. What matters is the extent, feasibility, methods and objectives of such interventions. Most of my interviewees maintained that Viktor Yushchenko is principally different from Leonid Kuchma in that the former loves Ukraine in himself, whereas the latter loves himself in Ukraine. Good for a start, isn’t it? We will see how he changes along the way. Now we can only judge the President by the company he is choosing for himself…
Mandate of Maidan
No one, apart from thousands of people in the Maidan, believed that Yushchenko would nominate Yulia Tymoshenko for the premiership. Ms Tymoshenko herself seemed to give up and be ready to accept an offer of the NCSD Secretary’s position. The President, however, had a different opinion, so he dictated his decree on appointing Tymoshenko acting Prime Minister at the moment his plane touched down in Moscow. Vladimir Putin looked flabbergasted during the whole joint press conference…
I do not think that an article on Putin’s meeting with Yanukovych after the repeat re-run, published in Borys Berezovsky’s “Kommersant” newspaper, caused Yushchenko to take this decision (although its timing is suggestive in and of itself). Neither was it caused by his desire to show the Kremlin he was going to pursue an independent HR policy. Presumably, there were several reasons behind Yushchenko’s choice of the Prime Minister.
First, Tymoshenko’s appointment means that Yushchenko needs prompt and visible economic results. Tymoshenko’s hard-line manner, alongside her creativity - her ability to generate ideas - won in a competition with the stability and thoroughness associated with Petro Poroshenko. Yushchenko needs tangible results in general and in particular before the 2006 parliamentary elections. Thus, he has staked his bet on Tymoshenko as a major engine of the changes he wants to acheive.
Second, Yushchenko had certain obligations to Yuliya Tymoshenko, stipulated in a document. Some say those were secret obligations, but the public seems quite well-informed about them. One can understand “Our Ukraine” members’ grievances, when they argue that Yushchenko had no right to commit the entire faction to sustaining Tymoshenko’s appointment in Parliament. In their opinion, he should have discussed the agreement with the faction before signing it. On the other hand, the indignant MPs must have known all along about those arrangements. Could they have expected Yushchenko to fulfill his obligations? According to our sources, Yushchenko tried to talk Tymoshenko out of her prime ministerial ambitions. A week before the appointment, he met with her twice. In both four-hour-long meetings he advised her to accept the post of the NCSD Secretary. She almost agreed, but right after the inauguration Yushchenko changed his mind. We may never learn what the last straw was, but taking his final decision, he must have understood that it would not be appropriate for the President to start his term in office by breaking a promise.
Third, Tymoshenko is a favourite of the Maidan, which, to Yushchenko, epitomizes the people’s will and power. During the inauguration ceremony, the Maidan was chanting: “Yuliya is our Premier!” The Maidan was her only lobbyist. The President’s willingness to act on the people’s urgent requests earns him some brownie points. Should Tymoshenko succeed, both the President and the people will be happy. Should she fail, he will not be held accountable for it: he was realizing the people’s will, which he could not ignore in the wake of the “orange” revolution.
Fourth, Tymoshenko can initiate revocation of constitutional reform. She has always been a steadfast opponent to it. Now numerous fellow-MPs, particularly Olexander Moroz, are demanding that she relinquish her beliefs. Yet the complaint to the Constitutional Court has been written and signed by over 60 MPs eager to repeal the constitutional amendments. The document is presently kept in Olexander Turchinov’s safe. And again, it is all guesswork how Tymoshenko (and Yushchenko as her ally) will choose to deal with it. As matters stand, Yuliya Tymoshenko has in her hands a powerful lever for reversing constitutional reform. Whether she gets a chance to become a prime minister with the exceptional powers envisioned by the constitutional amendments will depend solely on her government’s performance. Another possibility should also be considered, though. If the system of checks and balances puts spokes in the Tymoshenko cabinet’s wheels, she may go into the opposition again, hoping for the presidency in 2009, in which case she would prefer for the President to retain his current authority…
It is hard to say what Tymoshenko will do about constitutional reform, and whether she has any clear-cut agreements with Yushchenko on the matter. At the moment, she says what the MPs whose votes she’ll need in the Rada next week want to hear from her.
Some people are concerned over Tymoshenko’s radicalism. Yet one should not confuse the Tymoshenko at the mass rally with the Tymoshenko in the Premier’s office. She will hardly instigate a total revision of earlier privatizations. Prevention of abuses by oligarchs is not within her mandate. Petro Poroshenko will have to see to that. Yuliya Tymoshenko, being true to herself, will wage a war against the various schemes that the pillars of the former regime used to rob the state, rather than with those specific pillars themselves. When she was Vice Prime Minister for Fuel and Energy, she liquidated inter-company barter. I hope she will manage to close down all the holes and illegal corridors on the state border. Her Cabinet will make it impossible to profiteer from “gray” and “black” schemes of VAT reimbursement. I also hope Tymoshenko will pay attention to techno-parks and free economic zones, sort out what is happens to retired people’s money in the Pension Fund, and scrutinize practices in mining industries, etc, etc, etc.
Today, it is too early to judge to what extent the Cabinet of Ministers will be Yuliya Tymoshenko’s team, and to what extent it will be made of Viktor Yushchenko’s people. The President is likely to have the first right to nominate and approve ministers, and Tymoshenko will have to acknowledge it. According to some sources, the President will discuss only economic and cultural segments of the future government membership with her, giving the prerogative to propose uniformed ministers to Petro Poroshenko. Even if it is true, I am not sure what legal and constitutional tools, apart from information-gathering, Petro Poroshenko has at his disposal to control the uniformed ministries. Tymoshenko, conversely, has a lot of these tools. She will be able to revive constitutional norms that never worked under Leonid Kuchma, in particular, the provision empowering the prime minister to propose ministers and governors for the president’s approval, and to prevent the president from discharging them without the prime minister’s written consent. For ten years, this provision has been a mere formality. Viktor Yushchenko was the only prime minister in the recent history of Ukraine who availed himself of it, refusing, for twelve months, to hand to Leonid Kuchma a petition on Yuliya Tymoshenko’s dismissal from the vice prime minister’s post. Ms Tymoshenko will, undoubtedly, be making use of this law. I cannot rule out that, in appointing Tymoshenko to the position, Viktor Yushchenko counted on her toughness of character as a pretext to deny appointments to excessively power-thirsty coalition allies: “You know, I’m all for it, but Tymoshenko won’t propose you. Sorry, can’t do anything about it”. It is just a conjecture, but, who knows, it might come true in some cases.
The possible monitoring of her activities by Poroshenko and Zinchenko will, naturally, irritate Yuliya Tymoshenko. Presently, her relations with Olexander Zinchenko are very friendly. Her closest aide, Turchinov, is engaged in negotiating and drafting regulations on the presidential secretariat, a new institution to replace the former Administration. He could become Zinchenko’s first deputy in the Secretariat. If this is the case, the presidential office, albeit with a new name, and the Cabinet might find more incentives and opportunities for cooperation, instead of the eternal rivalry characteristic of the old structures. However, Tymoshenko should not hope for a standing amicable relationship with Zinchenko: life is long and a lot can happen…
Today, Tymoshenko gushes with ideas, and froths with tactical and strategic political plans. She will, undoubtedly, make a remarkable prime minister. She will not be looking for excuses, but for ways. Of course, she will make mistakes, given the drive and dynamism of her intended transformations. Yet she will be working conscientiously to produce positive results. She realizes, better than anyone else, that her political future is at stake.
In money matters, she should move cautiously, walking on eggshells. Eight years in the opposition, with a business destroyed by the regime, is a great challenge for a politician and a party leader with ambitions for the future and entrepreneurial talents. Her activity in the prime ministerial office will be thoroughly scrutinized. Thousands of people, including those officially authorized to do so, will watch her, hoping to catch her in the act. I hope Yuliya Tymoshenko will not give them this pleasure. I also hope she will not disappoint us journalists, who are an element of public control over the government.
What cannot be cured must be endured?
Olexander Zinchenko has received a brand new position as the State Secretary of Ukraine. We will not discuss this appointment in detail here, for lack of information on the nature of the state secretary’s scope of operation. The terms of reference are being developed, so it is not clear at the moment how the Secretariat will be different from the Administration. Besides, it remains obscure how services in charge of the President’s activity support, protocol, information supply, public relations and everyday life among the state secretary, the President’s newly appointed first aide Olexander Tretyakov, Vera Ulyanchenko who has been Viktor Yushchenko’s personal assistant for five years and Petro Poroshenko will be allocated. I’ll note en passant that Olexander Zinchenko must be a more significant political player that Viktor Medvedchuk. The latter did not hit upon the idea of calling his position “the President’s Head”, humbly contending himself with the “Head of the Presidential Administration”, while Olexander Zinchenko will be the State Secretary of Ukraine, take it or leave it.
Now let us consider Petro Poroshenko. Imagine a man who was keen on becoming a supermarket manager but was hired to be a library director. How he would feel roughly reflects Poroshenko’s feelings at being appointed Secretary of National Security and Defence. Of course, various candidates were considered for the prime ministerial position; the same people were then considered as potential candidates for other key posts. Yet whereas Yuliya Tymoshenko could, in theory, think of working in the NCSD, Poroshenko never even admitted such a possibility.
The whole country seems to know about Tymoshenko and Poroshenko’s reconciliatory dinner at the time, preceding the inauguration, when their contention over the post became evident to the public. Yuliya Tymoshanko did not conceal being invited to the dinner. So it took place in a small group at the Capuchin restaurant. Yushchenko demanded that his allies find a common language and come to a compromise. The candidates did their best. Tymoshenko suggested that if she became the Prime Minister and Poroshenko was appointed NCSD Secretary, he could form and supervise the uniformed segment of the government. Besides, she would not claim authority over the appointments to the Customs Committee and Tax Administration. Poroshenko declined, proposing the reverse option, which did not suit Tymoshenko. The dinner was friendly, but fruitless.
Then, Poroshenko learned about his appointment. During the two following days he would not make an appearance on Kameneva Street, where this once influential state body is located. He was waiting to talk with Yushchenko, apparently deciding for himself whether to accept this offer or not. The incautious comment by Speaker Volodymyr Lytvyn might testify to Poroshenko’s inner emotional struggle: “I am not sure that all the President’s nominees will accept their offers.” Lytvyn made this statement 40 minutes after the announcement of Yushchenko’s new appointments. Lytvyn could not have meant Zinchenko, could he? It is obvious that he did not mean Tymoshenko. Lytvyn’s statement became public proof of a fact of which Yushchenko was well aware: Lytvyn and Poroshenko have an effective channel of communication.
Not only did the tandem of Poroshenko and Lytvyn alert Yushchenko, but so also did a wider group of Poroshenko-Lytvyn-Malairenko-Azarov-Piskun. Due to this group, Poroshenko was not given the Prime Minister’s post.
Definitely, Yushchenko likes Yulia Tymoshenko’s position on reform much more than that of Petro Poroshenko. Poroshenko is convinced that constitutional reform was a part of the package which included the amendments of the election law. Had the election law not been changed and the members of the election commissions remained the same, in the third round of the election Yushchenko’s opponents would have robbed him not of 6-8 percent as it happened, but as much as 15 percent, which would have lead to another formal victory for Yanukovych. Yushchenko, apparently, does not share this opinion and believes that reform benefited Lytvyn and Moroz but not him.
Yushchenko gave the major candidates for the Prime Minister’s post some (I would even say too much) time to present their models of power distribution and compare their personal ambitions. Some say that Tymoshenko’s proposal turned out to be better and her position in the public confrontation between Tymoshenko and Poroshenko irritated Yushchenko less than that of Poroshenko. Aside from this, something happened between Yushchenko and Poroshenko, which is known only to them or even only to Yushchenko. This nullified the chances of one of Yushchenko’s closest companions-in-arms becoming the Prime Minister. Several assumptions are made regarding this, but we have no right to cite them, as there is no proof of any of them. On the whole we can only mention some business plans, allegedly developed by Poroshenko, that turned on Yushchenko’s table against Poroshenko’s will.
Having appointed Poroshenko NSDC secretary without talking to him, Yushchenko on the one hand acted quite normally, “since we are a team and you are appointed assigned important work, you, who have repeatedly stated your support of the president’s principles, must take it and work effectively.” Yet on the other hand, the man who did so much for Viktor Yushchenko’s campaign deserved a more respectful and considerate attitude. Accordingly, if a decision was made to appoint Tymoshenko Prime Minister, maybe it was worth discussing with Poroshenko where he saw himself, and whether the NSDC secretary’s position was interesting for him. If it were a matter of monitoring the government’s activity, Poroshenko would be definitely more efficient in his previous position as the head of the parliamentary budget committee.
Perhaps Yushchenko had grounds to fear that a number of the newly appointed officials as well as people yet to take the key positions would be trying to pursue their own agendas in their relations with the president. Due to this, the President plans frequent, almost daily, meetings of the National Security Council. It is not quite expedient, however, to turn this important state body into a place of identification parades. As an alternative, he might use his predecessor’s experience: frequent dinners with the speaker, prime minister, the head of the administration and the NSDC secretary. Yet it is up to the President to define the form.
One way or another, Poroshenko accepted Yushchenko’s offer, and met with him to discuss a number of issues, including spheres of his influence. One side insists that Poroshenko was satisfied with this conversation, and will make law enforcement his priority. The other side says that after this talk, Viktor Yushchenko could have boiled water without using fire. Dmitriy Vydrin was only partially right when he said in his TV interview that the influence of the NSDC secretary is determined by the quality of his team. Marchuk could have gathered an extremely qualified team, but he would stick to the assigned role of staff hangman. Radchenko in theory could have attracted professionals in all spheres (if needed, the list of the national security issues could be expanded to include everything from the birth rate to the privatization of Ukrtelecom), nevertheless, at the post of the NSDC secretary he would always be a person who was pensioned off to vacate the seat of the SBU head for Ihor Smeshko. The influence of the NSDC secretary on the situation in the country as well as on key decisions depends to a greater extent not on his team or authority laid down in law, but on the degree of trust in his relationship with the President, and on the personality of those holding this post. These were the two factors that determined the influence of Volodymyr Horbulin, while their lack in his successors decreased the importance and influence of the secretary and of the whole Council after Horbulin’s retirement.
If Poroshenko manages to become Horbulin, and sets up a reliable and trustworthy channel of communication with Yushchenko, he would be able to demand a lot. If he fails, he will be like a tiger locked in the cage of the NSDC secretary’s authorities outlined by the law: organizing meetings of the National Security Council, naming Council members for presidential approval, drafting presidential decrees based on the Council’s decisions and monitoring their fulfillment. He will be able to appeal to various institutions, ministries, and departments, and have access to classified documents of all levels to receive the information necessary for organization of the NSDC meetings. This is mostly it. In addition to the law on the National Security Council that clearly states the authority of its secretary, his role is mentioned in at least 15 other laws. However, they mostly refer to emergency situations and do not expand his authority.
In the long run, Oleksandr Zinchenko is in a better condition. Only Yushchenko’s promise to restrict the influence of the Presidential Administration can limit his levers. Poroshenko was appointed to a constitutional body. Certainly he will be able to create some additional levers of his own. But there is another Constitutional rule, which is currently being enforced. The decision of the National Security Council is published in the form of a presidential decree, which can be enforced only if signed by the ministry and the Prime Minister. Thus, Yulia Tymoshenko has the right to veto all NSDC decisions.
That is why Poroshenko must make every effort to move from Kameneva Street to Bankova Street and there set up not only his own office but the entire NDSC staff; to build a team almost from scratch; to change priorities and to re-qualify, from being a master of a behind-the-scene economic games into a public figure; to try to enjoy the huge amount of new knowledge which he is to acquire, and to prove to the president that he has no regrets that the steering wheel of Ukraine’s economy was given to somebody else.
He has also another way, which is to get into a hard, public and hidden fight with his more successful competitors. But this could become a very short way… By that time he will have already stepped down from the deputy’s mandate and the budget committee, and have broken off his relations… In a word, Petro Poroshenko should remember that he has a diplomatic education and act correspondently, otherwise his position will be the most vulnerable one.
Yulia MOSTOVAYA