It is now obvious that Russian spin doctors, specially commissioned by their clients in the Presidential Office in Kyiv, exploited the idea of “civil war” as a leitmotif for the presidential campaign in Ukraine. This idea gave rise to twin myths, that of the pro-Russian and the anti-Russian candidates. The myths divided the country, to the great concern of people in Ukraine and beyond. Thus, Europe is worried about a likely re-drawing of state borders in the continent and a related instability in the territory through which Russian and Turkmen gas is transported to the EU. A part of the Russian establishment seems apprehensive about the potential repercussions that Ukrainian separatism might have on Russian autonomy, which does not mean, however, that Moscow, should it fail to find common ground with the new Ukrainian leadership, would refuse to aid and abet “pockets of resistance” in Ukraine’s territory.
The recent separatist sentiments expressed by governors and other officials in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts have been caused by several subjective factors. First, ballot-rigging was the most intensive and large-scale in those regions, both in the first round and in the run-off. Therefore, the governors have a lot to lose, with criminal proceedings looming before them. Second, many people in the region, chronically deprived of unbiased information about the actual situation in the country, feel deceived. To many in South-Eastern Ukraine, separation from “America-loving zombie-spongers” looks like the only possible way out. Third, large enterprise directors, led by Mr Buslayev, have also played their crucial (or shall I say “criminal”?) role in the crisis.
Buslayev’s claim that “Ukraine is East, only East and nothing but East” aimed to divide the nation into “bread-winners” and “parasites”. A fundamentally false statement, since, according to the Presidential Office data on budget contributions and governmental subsidies allocated to the region, the input into the national economy provided by Donetsk Oblast is equal to that by Vinnytsia Oblast [in the centre of the country].
Finally, none of the meetings organized by the rebellious oblasts’ administrations could ever have taken place without Leonid Kuchma’s consent and approval. That he personally coordinated the governors’ activities by giving them telephone orders is hard to prove with evidence, although there should have been witnesses to such talks. Yet sheer logic suggests that the outgoing President has had his finger in the pie. For instance, Governor Volodymyr Yatsuba of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast denounced all the separatist ideas proclaimed by Kushnariov (Kharkiv Oblast), Blyzniuk (Donetsk Oblast) and Yefremov (Luhansk Oblast), but he did attend the separatists’ convention. This controversial behaviour of his can only be accounted for by the President’s instructions, which Mr Yatsuba has always dutifully followed.
The same motive is behind [Crimean Speaker of Parliament] Boris Deich’s presence at the two last separatist conventions. An extremely cautious and reserved man, he would never have gotten involved in a collective shady enterprise unless so instructed from the top. Wrong were those who argued that the President had nothing to do with the Eastern governors’ separatist initiatives and blamed them entirely on Moscow schemes. Leonid Kuchma, whom a certain part of the Ukrainian political elite believed, albeit with numerous reservations, to care about Ukrainian statehood, could be acting out of spite and vindictiveness: when nominating Yanukovych as his successor he gloated: “You’ve wanted Ukraine without Kuchma, I’ll see how you like it”; now he must be guided by a different principle: “If I can’t have it, no one else will”.
The latest wave of bureaucratic separatism, instigated by Bankova Street, will subside after the elections. However, the dividing lines will most likely remain in place for a long time to come, primarily because they have been there ever since Ukraine gained independence. During the elections, these lines were just highlighted, brought to the fore and made “extra-heavy”, in math terms. The political consultants hired by the authorities to promote the governmental candidate did not choose to break up the electorate into, say, beer-lovers and vodka-drinkers. They rehashed and foregrounded the contradictions inherited from the Soviet era, which the country’s leaders have ignored for 13 years. The differences in culture, traditions, languages, foreign policy priorities, and attitudes to democratic values have faded, being eclipsed by the dire need for citizens in Eastern, Southern, Central, Northern and western Ukraine to earn their daily bread. Yet those regional differences did not disappear. Moreover, they may stay with us forever, varying in intensity and scope at one time or another. The history of practically every European country proves it. Those differences can be turned into Ukraine’s treasure: diversity can be transformed into a benefit, rather than a delayed-action mine under our sovereignty and territorial integrity. We all have to work hard to make it happen.
The latest developments could be for the better, after all: the painful mutual grievances and outright accusations that regions exchange today, sometimes with no good reason and sometimes quite justifiably, could climax in a catharsis allowing Ukraine to recover from its chronic ailment. Could it be for luck that we have broken, as the common superstition about dishes goes? We should not try to glue the pieces together forcibly - it will not work. The new government should learn the skills to build the country anew. We should help to do it together. This article is ZN’s first attempt to look at what the new government should do to bring together such a heterogeneous country.
Too many cooks spoil the broth
The experts whose opinion I sought in the last few days put forward various, often conflicting, versions and suggestions. Yet there are several things about which they all agree.
Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union a disproportional and regionally unbalanced industrial capacity. It is not the Ukrainian government’s fault; nor is it the achievement of Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv or Dnipropetrovsk. It is the result of the decisions made by USSR leaders long ago. The truth is, however, that over the years of the country’s independent development, the authorities have failed to address the need to restructure the industry, with due regard, inter alia, for regional factors. More than that, post-Soviet disproportion was aggravated by unfair taxation and budget allocation systems established after the Soviet Union’s collapse.
The situation cries out for a drastic overhaul of relations between the central and local budgets. Most experts agree that the greater part of local tax revenues should remain in the regions. The central government should only receive funds required to support the vital needs of the state (defence, foreign policy, law enforcement, etc) and to implement national programmes, some of which should be geared towards resolving regional problems, including environmental and social (job creation) programmes for depressed regions. Something of this kind is being done today, but the programmes are not based on an unprejudiced needs analysis or feasibility studies, but rather on regional leaders’ high-handedness or closeness to the key figures in the central government.
A regional map of Ukraine should be compiled on the basis of their assessment against objective criteria. Experts believe such criteria should include average life expectancy at birth, birth rate, unemployment rate, migration rate (particularly that of labour migration),average and minimum salaries, industrial and agricultural potential, investments in the region, most acute environmental challenges, access to education, status of cultural development, research capacity and the like. An objective picture thus drawn will enable the new central authorities to grasp the true depth and width of the current regional unbalance, assess the scope of the problem and set priorities accordingly. It will also help them find ways and means of addressing these problems at the central and regional levels. The process should be utterly transparent and open to public consultation.
At present, almost every ministry or governmental agency has a department, division or unit dealing in regional matters. Yet their efforts do not complement one another to form a comprehensive regional policy. Experts are positive that Ukraine needs a specialized central body of authority vested with responsibility for regional policy-making and for interdepartmental coordination in policy implementation. Some underscore the need to set up a ministry for regional policy within the new Cabinet of Ministers. While acknowledging the rationale behind this approach, one should remember that any regional policy is multifaceted in and of itself. Thus, in order to take over some of the functions currently performed by the Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Culture, State Committee for Youth, Family and Sports and many others, the new ministry will have to have a huge staff, a multistory building and a pool of Mercedes cars. Opponents of this idea think a ministry for regional policy will be as difficult to create as a ministry for European integration. In a number of countries, though, such ministries operate fairly effectively. In other states regional affairs fall within the purview of home ministries (or ministries of the interior), which also control the police, but only as part of their duties.
Undoubtedly, territorial integrity of the country is a component of its national security. Until 1999, there existed a pretty effective network of interdepartmental commissions attached to the Council for National Security and Defence of Ukraine. If the new President decides to restore this network, it may be placed in charge of regional policy development, implementation and oversight, provided the Council’s role will be determined by its actual ability to promote reforms in the relevant areas, rather than by the Council Secretary’s loyalty to the President.
Alternatively, a governmental committee for interdepartmental coordination of regional policy could be set up to provide advice to the Cabinet vis-a-vis best the policy options and decision-making. A similar practice was applied in Ukraine for a short time when Viktor Yushchenko was Prime Minister: the First Vice Prime Minister chaired the Committee, whose sessions were attended by the ministers and concerned regional leaders. The Committee could handle the issues of comprehensive and proportional regional development through direct cooperation between regional representatives and specialized governmental structures in a systemic and transparent way.
Another option still is to breathe new life into the Council of Regions under the President, which could convene regionally, rather than in Kyiv.
Local officials and their supporters
At this juncture it seems appropriate to discuss personnel matters. Kushnariov, Blyzniuk and Yefremov’s inevitable dismissal and possible arraignment will not only take heart out of the separatist business in Kharkiv, Donetsk and Luhanks Oblasts, but also discourage officials from other Eastern and Southern oblasts from following suit.
At the same time, new governors should be appointed with due regard for those regions’ characteristics. I do not think the heads of electoral offices in Luhansk and Kharkiv can make good governors and properly represent the new President there: they have no authority in the public eye, as the election outcomes testify.
The Industrial Union of Donbass, squeezed from Donetsk by Rinal Akhmetov, will most probably try to promote their man to be governor in Luhansk Oblast. On the other hand, the “Yabluko” Party will advance their candidate. No matter what approach Viktor Yushchenko takes to personnel matters (it applies to all future appointments), he, having promised to make the government fair and open, will have to substantiate all key personnel decisions to the public. You will remember that Leonid Kuchma has never bothered to explain why he discharged or upgraded certain officials. Experts and journalists have always had to guess what his real motives could be: Russia told him to sack this one, [personally related tycoon] Yaroslavsky asked him to promote that one, [Presidential Administration Head] Medvedchuk wanted to do away with the third one and so on and so forth. Of course, Yushchenko will have to listen to the opinion of his entourage, local communities and business, but he also should inform us, citizens, about the terms of his sharing responsibility with these groups for a certain personnel decision, how will the public benefit from it and how eligible is the candidate for a position.
Now for specific reshufflings. Kushnariov’s successor is going to face a host of problems. On the one hand, the new governor will be able to rely on the city mayor, who supported Yushchenko, and a group of local businessmen who showed loyalty to Yushchenko. On the other hand, Kharkiv Oblast residents do not dislike Kushnariov. Besides, he placed his men in dozens of official posts at different levels. Their identification, replacement or conversion will take time. An official conversant with the background and local specifics will be in the best position to do it. Among such people are, to name a few, Volodymyr Shumilkin (Kharkiv Mayor), Volodymyr Filenko (an “area specialist” responsible for the oblast within “Our Ukraine”) and Oleh Diomin (Deputy head of the Presidential Administration, former governor of Kharkiv Oblast).
The new authorities will have to move carefully with appointments in Odessa and Dnipropetrovsk. Large-scale election irregularities and ballot-rigging was common here, too. According to “Our Ukraine” members, both governors have twice lost their chance to abide by the law. The election re-run will give them a third chance. In principle, Volodymyr Yatsuba, who has never concealed his dislike of Yanukovych, could put barriers to falsifications in his oblast. Yet he was, reportedly, too irritated with Yuliya Tymoshenko’s promises to appoint somebody else to his current position as soon as the opposition wins.
Over a relatively short time in office, Yatsuba has attracted substantial investments into the oblast economy. Unlike other governors, he has not started his own business in the entrusted oblast. In terms of professionalism and relevance, Yatsuba is in the proper place, both in Dnipropetrovsk and in the Cabinet of Ministers. In terms of respecting the citizens’ free will as required by law, Yatsuba does not belong to the new generation of officials. It is now up to Yushchenko to decide which pan of the scales out-weighs…
The situation with [Odessa Oblast governor] Hrynevetsky is even more complicated. He is a quick-witted and droll person, well liked by the local public, a competent specialist and manager. During the elections, he followed the Yanukovych team’s instructions thoroughly, but not fanatically. The Yushchenko crew is said to want him in Kyiv, for both professional and political reasons: Hrynevetsky is well connected in Moscow. What got into him during the first and second election rounds is hard to say, but the governor of Odessa Oblast talked a lot of hot air, called the people on Kyiv’s Independence Square mobsters and actively participated in steering the separatist conventions in the South-East. It is again up to Yushchenko to decide where to have him.
Hrynevetsky, however, is not the gravest problem of the region. The new President will have to deal with a very unusual man, the elected Odessa Mayor Ruslan Bodelan. Odessa inhabitants themselves are suspicious of this stranger, due to which every possible personnel decision with respect to the oblast could prove double-edged.
In Zaporizhzhia, no potential governor will feel comfortable next to the omnipresent and omnipotent Mayor Kartashov. At present, there are several candidates for the post, but it will be a tough pick to make.
Donetsk is the hardest of all. Yushchenko will immediately remove Blyzniuk from office, there is doubt of that. Yet the perennial Donetsk feudalism will not go with him. Rinat Akhmetov is the root cause of the problem and the key to its resolution. According to experts, Ukraine’s richest multimillionaire has absolute power in the region: he controls business, government, budget, the courts, prosecution, the police and other public institutions in the oblast territory.
Yushchenko is aware of it. Over the last months he has had ample opportunity to feel it. In fact, nobody drove Yushchenko’s representatives from district and territorial election commissions. They were cynically bribed not to turn up there. Those few who proved unresponsive to financial arguments, were ultimately convinced with physical arguments. Yushchenko must understand that any official he appoints to a leading position in Donetsk oblast if he wins will be exposed to similar pressure.
Three scenarios are possible under the circumstances. First, Yushchenko forgets about Donetsk Oblast and leaves it to Akhmetov’s discretion. The oblast remains a closed enclave where Ukrainian sovereignty is represented only with a flag and emblem. In this case, a unified Ukraine is out of the question. So is an effective promotion of the rule of law and protection of human rights in the country.
Second, Kyiv and Donetsk wage an eternal war on each other. It is a lose-lose situation leading to a new deadlock.
Third, the parties sign a non-aggression pact, agreeing to divide responsibilities and spheres of influence. I would venture a guess that Akhmetov is ready to negotiate the terms. Yushchenko could also be ready, provided that his electoral promise to separate state power from big business reflects a true determination to act accordingly when in office.
Consensus-seeking should be phased in. In the first stage, Yushchenko points out the funds Akhmetov still owes to the budget, having paid less than the fair market price for the large enterprises he privatized. May we remind you that the Russian bidders offered for Kryvorizhstal Metal Works twice as much as Akhmetov and Pinchuk paid for it? Thus the oligarchs retain their ownership of the enterprises only if they pay the missing part of the fair market price to the state budget. When it is settled, the parties pass to the second stage.
If Yushchenko is elected President, he will be able to make an attractive offer to Akhmetov. He, on behalf of the state, can offer the Donetsk multimillionaire guarantees of a level playing field with other oligarchs, including those from his team; fair competition; effective protection of their property rights in independent courts; free movement across the country and throughout the world; protection from harassment of business by numerous controlling bodies; state support for Donetsk business in the international marketplace; active state protection of Donetsk enterprises from anti-dumping and other investigations abroad; budget subsidies for environmental, social and other programmes in the mining areas, including targeted state programmes for Donetsk Oblast.
What will Yushchenko want from Akhmetov in return? Not much - the state’s inviolability in the territory of Donetsk oblast, which comprises at least two elements: non-interference with the public administration and sanctity of the budget. Should Akhmetov or any other oligarch breech the pact, they will have themselves to blame for an active anti-corruption investigation by the prosecution authorities. They are free to drink vodka in the sauna with governors if they please, but they cannot use public budgets or corrupt the police and secret services. Otherwise they will be called to account. This will be the rule of law promised to us by Viktor Yushchenko.
There is one remark to make, however. Yushchenko should ensure that Rinat Akhmetov, Viktor Pinchuk, Olexander Yaroslavsky, Ihor Kolomoisky or any other businessman of their caliber will never have reasons to complain to him: “Why are we not allowed to do what Petro, Yuliya, David or Roman do?” Yushchenko is responsible for the people near him.
Frankly speaking, everyone in Ukraine is sick and tired of favouritism, the insiders’ economy and preferential treatment. The old officials and their associates will welcome universal equity in law. The new authorities should welcome it too. This parity could serve as a powerful uniting force in our disjointed country.
United we stand
The programme of uniting the nation should be a top priority for the state, and a recognized need for society. All the might of the state propaganda should focus on it. The nation-uniting process should be cultivated in a professional, talented, exciting, competent and politically correct way. A uniting ideology should be developed, together with a series of projects, events and activities aiming to put it into life. What can it be? Who can contribute to it? First and foremost, impartial and professional television and other media. There should be no region or community in the country with an ideological dictate of any particular political force. It applies to both the government and the opposition, likely to preserve control over a number of regions and media outlets. The people should have the right and the opportunity to receive objective information and draw their own conclusions.
Ukraine badly needs a programme “Know Your Motherland”. Viktor Yushchenko, keen on Ukrainian history, could have a great personal role to play in fostering it. Most of our compatriots do not know our history, do not want to know it or have no opportunity to learn it. While textbook designers are improving their interpretations of the ancient chronicles, this generation can start learning this country from what it has to offer today. Have you been to Pochayiv Lavra? To Sofiyivka or Berestechko? Have you visited Chernivtsi? Have you roamed the Carpathians? Have you seen the Stone Tomb, Kamenetsk-Podilsky Fortress, Khersones or Sviatohorsk Monastery? I have been to 40 countries of the world, but I have seen so little of my native Ukraine!
In the Soviet times, schoolchildren could travel to Brest, Riga, Minsk, Leningrad or Moscow. Their Ukrainian peers, alas, have very limited opportunities to see their country, appreciate its cultural diversity and acknowledge that despite the existing differences we all are worthy of respect and compassion. The state should not economize on these programmes to open new perspectives for the new generation.
The capital city should make its adequate contribution into the unification processes. It is common knowledge that the majority of businesses and the largest public and private companies have their head offices in Kyiv. Therefore they pay taxes to the city budget. The capital city is made to share its revenues with other regions. Many concerned parties perceive the current principles of revenue redistribution as unfair. Depressive regions, in their turn, reprimand Kyiv and other cities with million-strong population. The inter-regional tax redistribution should, certainly, be streamlined on the basis of objective criteria.
Visitors coming to Kyiv from other regions should be able to see how well people can live in their country. They should be proud of their capital and do their best to approach Kyiv’s living standards. Indeed, a lot has been done to improve life in Kyiv; it looks like many European cities. It is essential that millions of Ukrainians realize that life can be good in their home country. Moreover, it is getting better. In this sense, the Maidan triggered people’s love of their capital city and desire to know it better. For most of the protest action participants it was their first visit to Kyiv; but for the rally they could have never seen this city with their own eyes and could have never understood that Kyiv residents are like them: friendly, hospitable and empathetic.
The new government should give the green light to public television. It could broadcast the best programmes of regional channels as part of the project “Know Your Motherland”. A lot of people in our country truly care for their homeland, for the place where they live. Some regional history museums can boast rare exhibits worthy of international fame. Some people can share life stories that the entire country would like to know. Some communities can tell the rest of the country about their unique accomplishments and challenges. We have to inspire people’s interest in these things. A public television of the new type will be an invaluable means to this end.
Special attention should be paid to young people. It is hard to overcome stereotypes imbued in Soviet times in several generations of our compatriots, particularly in the East. The enterprises where they have worked all their lives were built under the USSR, while the independent Ukrainian government has not done anything comparable in scale to the industrial reconstruction of the post-war decades. Instead, it has generated countless problems… The young people should be cured of this nostalgia, and offered better realities of a new life that would outshine their parents’ reminiscences (without playing down their significance). The USA is known as the “melting pot” of nations; Ukraine should become a pot where one nation will melt all internal contradictions to produce an alloy of tolerance, curiosity and love of both our particular homeland, and the country at large. It should be done for the sake of those who will be building and developing this state tomorrow.
Many countries of the world carry out cultural exchange programmes for students. The modular system of education enables Ukrainian universities to send their students for internships to other countries, upon completion of which they continue their education at home. If Kyiv Polytechnic or Agrarian Universities can refer their students to Germany, the USA, Canada or the UK, why cannot they set up some kind of exchange programmes with universities in Poltava, Kharkiv or Lviv? The students could receive their bachelor’s degree from Uzhgorod or Ternopil Universities and go for master’s programmes to Kharkiv, Kyiv or Sumy. This is a common practice in western countries: students do a semester in Germany, three semesters in Scotland, two semesters in France, etc. In this way they come to know the world, tolerance and respect for its diversity. We could do the same within the country.
Military service should be based on the ex-territorial principle. For want of funding, the Ministry of Defence arranges for young soldiers to serve in their own region: privates from Luhansk stay in Luhansk oblast, from Lviv - in Lviv oblast, etc. Thus the Ministry cuts transportation costs. Besides, the servicemen’s relatives can come to visit and bring food, a shortage of which is the bane of the Armed Forces. The new authorities promise to reduce the term of military service and improve funding of the Armed Forces. In doing so, they should learn from whatever good there was in the former Soviet Army and adapt it to our situation. It would be useful for a recruit from Donetsk to serve in Trans-Carpathians, for a guy from Sumy to go to Ivano-Frankivsk, and for a Crimean resident to spend his service time in Cherkassy. The same is true for officers.
We could revive the sports competitions for university students that the Soviet Union used to hold periodically. The best stadiums and gymnasiums should be allocated for these contests, their logistics should be professional, and the events should be bright, emotional and challenging. Sports and a healthy lifestyle should also become national priorities.
The Maidan gave a new impetus to the popularity of Ukrainian songs. These are modern tunes and arrangements deserving to compete for the Eurovision award. It is critical that the young musicians (and artists) have a free hand in creating their own subculture. Concert halls and stages in the country should allow room not only for traditional performances, but for experimental theatre and music as well.
School curricula should allocate more hours to Russian Literature. Recent generations of high school students have had a couple of hours in class to study Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. Some may say Shakespeare is equally important. I agree, particularly if our students read his plays or sonnets in the original. Perhaps the Ministry of Education does not have to envision a greater number of hours for Russian Literature as a discipline, but the masterpieces of classical and modern Russian literature should be studied more thoroughly and profoundly, especially in the regions where Russian speakers prevail. It should become trendy for young people to know Ukrainian. No ministerial instructions will work here, but Ukrainian-speaking pop stars and other role models for youth can promote the language most effectively.
A couple of days ago I took part in a discussion of the optimal ways for re-unifying Ukraine’s regions and for establishing contacts between the new government and the oblasts that predominantly support Viktor Yanukovych. One of the speakers reminded us about the 60th anniversary of the Victory in WWII to be celebrated on 9 May next year. He suggested it would be a good idea if the veterans of the Soviet Army and of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army could shake hands with one another: “They should do it because there are very few of them left and they will be gone soon. Their handshake will consolidate the nation. It will be a token of understanding, forgiveness and peace for their children, grandchildren and great grandchildren. Spaniards did it to reconcile the nation.” Frankly speaking, I do not think it possible in this country. Nor do I think we have the right to hurt the feelings of 85-year-old men and women, asking them to revise their beliefs at the end of their lives. Yet their children and grandchildren can do it, on that day and due to that day. Anyway, the new government will have to think of how to make sure that the anniversary facilitates mutual understanding rather than re-open old wounds of hatred and distrust.
There are plenty of ideas about the nation’s reunification. We should be aware that their implementation will take time, colossal effort, patience, tact and reason. The church cannot be a unifying factor, because it is itself divided. We cannot unite at the threat of a common foe, because different regions of Ukraine have different international preferences and aversions. Yet, strange as it might seem, the new government can unite us, although it is presently rejected by some regions of the country. It is natural: we all have similar problems, in Lviv, Kyiv, Kharkiv, Vinnytsia, Luhansk or Crimea we all suffer from selective enforcement of law, corruption, lack of fair and independent judiciary, poor living standards and disrespect of human rights. It is the legacy of the old government. If the new authorities manage to pursue a policy that will change the situation for citizens, regardless of the region, in all of the above spheres, these authorities will gain recognition, trust, esteem and support and, eventually, will unite the nation. The national idea will never work in Ukraine if it favours only one ethnicity: too many external factors and internal traditions have been interwoven in this territory. It means that this unifying national idea should be of a universal nature, emphasizing economic values, human rights and freedoms.
Once a foreigner asked me: “What is the difference between Russians and Ukrainians, after all?” I let it pass with a joke: “If you offer a luxurious house, a limo and a suitcase stuffed with dollars to a Russian and a Ukrainian, but ask them to give up their nuclear weapons in exchange, the Russian will decline, where the Ukrainian will accept”. Ukraine is a European country that does not want to scare the world. It wants to be respected. Its citizens want to live a dignified life, with high standards of living and guaranteed civil rights. A wealthy peaceful country is an ideal for both Eastern and Western Ukraine. How close we approach the ideal will depend on the new government.
Yulia Mostova