But if a negative and even very negative reaction to the constitutional reform is expected from Strasbourg, as follows from Havrysh's opinion, then the efforts to complete the reform before the PACE session mean only one thing: let this negative reaction already be the last and irreversible, and let us, finally, be "cleaned out" of there, freeing our hands for holding elections.
It seems that the dragging out of invitations for observers, in particular from the OSCE, by the executive branch is calculated for the same thing. After the adoption of the constitutional changes, they themselves will "fade away" from us and leave Ukraine, like Belarus, alone with Moscow to solve its political problems.
Another explanation for the haste authored by Hapochka is also more amusing than alarming: protest actions. Supposedly, when it gets warm, the people will simply "storm" the Verkhovna Rada to defend the currently effective Constitution.
On the one hand — the people are unlikely to "storm" anything. The latest discussions on this topic in the media, as well as the absence of any hints at organizing corresponding processes, do not attest to any "threat." On the other hand — well, whoever has been ignoring the people, it's the Verkhovna Rada deputies, who fear them neither in their single-mandate districts nor on Khreshchatyk.
So there must be some other reasons.
Ukraine without Kuchma already in April?
One of them was seemingly named at one time by Moroz: Kuchma's possible self-resignation in April and the announcement of early presidential elections, which, according to Moroz's calculations, would in that case fall in the height of the beach season in August and would allow the authorities to maximally falsify the elections in the absence of real voters.
If, considering this version, we discard the distrust (one should express it more strongly, but it's worth refraining) of Kuchma's ability to utter such words as "resignation of powers," — the following should be noted.
Summer elections — this is, in fact, another project "anti-Yushchenko" — "anti-Yushchenko-2."
Which denies or crosses out the project "anti-Yushchenko-1": simply a large-scale reduction of presidential powers through reform. Here, by the way, everything seems plausible: even in anticipation of the "devaluation" of the presidential post, the "mochilovo" against Yushchenko does not subside anywhere...
But, secondly — then all this should mean that Kuchma has finally decided on his successor? And initially it is precisely him that he should have installed as prime minister, rather than allowing Yanovych to receive albeit too illusory, but still immunity, and most importantly — a political vote of confidence from the "coalition."
After all, in the event of Yanovych's quick resignation, it will be awkward for that same majority to give their votes to a completely different person as president.
However — whether it's convenient for the majority or not — that's not the point. The point is that, knowing about Kuchma's voluntary resignation, the majority simply will not accept his proposals regarding the premier.
Then — having thrown out the current premier and not appointing a new one — Kuchma cannot resign: there is no one to perform the duties under the current Constitution. And the presidential candidate from the acting head is such that even summer elections may not help him... Even if at that time the head of the Presidential Administration remains (as once in the Kremlin Voloshyn) Medvedchuk himself.
So, considering these circumstances, we must understand: according to the scenario Moroz described, Kuchma has no other successor besides Yanovych, and it is precisely for his sake that he is supposedly ready to go into early resignation and hold early elections. Glory to Yanovych!
And at the same time — death to the reform? And the acceleration of voting on it is merely an acceleration of the approach of its inglorious finale? And this is what the leaders of the "constitutional coalition" are doing, forgetting about rest? Is this why they are fighting for the proportional law, irritating the regions with proportional representation for local elections, and so on?
And is this why Yanovych himself squeezed out of the "coalition" a second term of "immunity" for the premier's post — at a time when a full basket of presidential powers is in store for him?
The logic here is dubious, but one must recall that Moroz proposed preventing early elections, that is, Kuchma's resignation, by postponing the completion of the reform.
That is, according to his logic, under the current Constitution Kuchma will not go into self-resignation.
Why, exactly? Because he won't want to hand over his powers to a successor? But if the reform is ahead — that's not so scary for Kuchma, although not interesting for the successor.
But if the "successor" is Yanovych, then he is interested in remaining as head of government after the reform, and the success of a summer election campaign, like Kuchma's early resignation, is of no use to him.
Because if he simultaneously is both a presidential candidate and premier, then, having won the elections (we assume the summer model works), he will have to choose himself which post to occupy: a plenipotentiary premier or a non-plenipotentiary president. If he remains premier — that will mean new presidential elections, and again early ones...
So is it precisely because of such a scheme that Kuchma will refrain, according to Moroz's version, from self-resignation in April — if the reform is first postponed, but then nevertheless carried out?
Something doesn't add up here...
Kuchma as premier — with Medvedchuk as speaker
And Kuchma's self-resignation, indeed, can have only one variant of expediency and effectiveness, and only for the "guarantor" himself: it is when he, having resigned presidential powers, finally receives the right to hold other posts.
And without waiting for the new president to take the oath, as written in the Constitution, he will be able to run for the post of prime minister.
And, of course, in this case the reform must already be carried out, expanded powers transferred to the premier. But not all: for the period until the elections, the powers of the president himself, who voluntarily resigned, must be performed by... the chairman of the Verkhovna Rada. That is exactly how it is written in the draft constitutional amendments.
A few purely technological moments will remain. The premier's post must then already be free: this, if Yanovych becomes the "successor," will happen only after the summer elections, but one will still have to wait for the inauguration. Too long. After that Kuchma may be written off.
Therefore, the premier's post should be freed immediately after the reform and Kuchma's self-resignation. And the ex-president should be appointed head of government even before the elections, even early ones. This, of course, will also not improve the chances of the government's candidate, and therefore — will devalue the presidential gesture regarding self-resignation and the organization of an early campaign.
Again the ghost of Yushchenko arises, even in summer.
To compensate for all this trouble in this situation, only one person could: the speaker, who would perform presidential duties until a new one is elected, and at the same time would have all the levers of administrative influence, influence over the security forces, and so on...
Yes, in the speaker's place — acting president — in such a case Medvedchuk should sit, whom Moroz, while presenting the version of Kuchma's self-resignation, seemingly completely forgot about...
But Medvedchuk simply will not manage to get into the Verkhovna Rada in April under any circumstances: Kivalov himself still has not scheduled by-elections in his district and plans them only for late May — June.
Is speaker Lytvyn capable, performing presidential duties, of keeping Medvedchuk as head of his Administration, who will be preoccupied with Yanovych's victory in early elections, and meanwhile organizing in the Verkhovna Rada the election of Kuchma as premier?
Probably capable.
But then why still rush with the reform, in order to secure for "daddy" the post of plenipotentiary premier — for the left factions?... Or are they thus tempting "daddy" so that he makes a wrong move?
But how in this case with the terms of bringing the updated Constitution into force? To be or not to be the planned four-month postponement? When the powers of branches of government change only in August...
But if the new Constitution comes into force only in August — then Kuchma's self-resignation and, accordingly, the Kuchma-as-premier variant will become unnecessary and impossible. At the same time, if early elections are not scheduled, the regular elections will take place, finally scheduled by parliament.
The only thing theoretically possible from what has been stated — that Medvedchuk by that time will get into the Verkhovna Rada, abandoning "daddy" at his post to fend for himself... That too looks too illusory.
In general, this whole story with Kuchma's likely resignation somewhat resembles the story of the removal in Russia of premier Kasyanov three weeks before Putin's re-election. Then too a myth was told about the reason for this resignation: supposedly, if Putin's elections had been disrupted, he would have lost his powers and they would have passed to the head of government...
In reality, Putin needed to remove Kasyanov for only one reason: to emphasize that he is the "new president." Although not everyone is convinced that this was needed by Putin himself, and not by someone from his new entourage.
But in any case, the nonsense about the threat of presidential powers passing to the premier in the event of disrupted elections is built solely on complete ignorance of one article of the Russian Constitution: as in Ukraine, and everywhere in the world, the president resigns his powers only before the new president after his inauguration.
So in reality, if one election is disrupted — one can hold new ones and disrupt them again, and during this time the president continues to perform his powers...
By the way, in reality it is precisely this mechanism that may turn out to be employed in the final variant in Ukraine.
But the myth about the Russian "trouble" made its impression on many, including in Ukraine, where it was spread by Medvedchuk's media.
Something similar is seen in the story with "Kuchma's self-resignation": someone wants to provoke someone into certain actions and is tossing in motivation. In reality, it is enough to look at the norms of the current Constitution and the one that is supposedly about to be adopted... However, the latter is very hard to do. Because even if it is adopted, until the last minute it is unknown what exactly.
300 "golden shares"
Disputes over election laws continue. And even the new law on presidential elections, approved by 411 votes, Kuchma has not signed or made public.
Although he could have done so — to encourage the participants of the bargaining regarding the promptness of bringing the proportional law into force for deputies.
By the way, as we predicted, Kuchma also vetoed the amendments to the law on political parties regarding party membership of State Tax Administration employees and the registration of local party organizations. And although this document was not a prerequisite for the reform, the symptom is obvious.
However, something else is more important: a few days before the final adoption of the constitutional changes, the parliamentary constitutional commission, and with it the entire Verkhovna Rada, still have not decided on the procedure: to vote on all changes in one package or article by article.
And not only the text of the future Constitution depends on this, into which part of the innovations may get in and part may not.
The configuration of the new future "coalition" depends on the final version of the "package," which — despite all denials — will nevertheless include the left. And if it doesn't include them — then the reform may not take place.
At least, this is exactly how one should view the surprise of some of the most outspoken communists regarding the "immunity" that Yanovych secured for himself, relying only on the norm of draft No. 4105 known to him, that the premier will resign his powers not before the new president, but before the new parliament.
The communists are surprised that in this case Yanovych is looking toward 2006, although the formation of a new coalition in the Verkhovna Rada, in their opinion, will begin immediately after the new provisions of the Constitution come into force, and still in this composition of parliament.
Something similar is told by socialist Rudkovsky in his latest interview in "Kyiv Telegraph" — obviously aiming to reassure voters of the left opposition that, supposedly, the reform is not being done for the clans of Yanovych-Medvedchuk-Pinchuk.
Although, of course, this reassurance of the left should immediately disconcert the oligarchic structures of the majority.
And all this together should lead to a revision of those constitutional changes that the constitutional commission will submit to the parliament's vote.
Someone, citing the preservation of direct presidential elections, will want to cancel the norm on the government resigning before the Verkhovna Rada.
Someone will propose again to curtail the president's right to too often dissolve parliament. They have already agreed to cancel the imperative mandate, and then God himself commanded to discard the transitional provision on proportional representation...
And one also needs to agree on when the norms on changing the powers of the current president and the current premier with his coalition begin to operate. After all, so far what is written means that the same minister can be appointed/dismissed by both. The same nonsense with the subordination of the security forces: for some time they will be torn between dependence on the "handsome" Kuchma and the "smart" Verkhovna Rada.
So if all this and much else is coordinated for a "package" vote in the constitutional commission — a confrontation will arise between two "coalitions": the current and the potential one.
And if they nevertheless decide to vote article by article, that is, to remove unnecessary articles directly in the hall — an even more interesting situation will arise, when even a single vote of some majoritarian is capable of breaking the whole game.
The consequence of which will be an absolutely unpredictable text of the "updated" Constitution.
They will show us all
It is known that absolute power corrupts absolutely. But what the real or imagined possession of a "golden share" does to politicians — is generally hard to imagine.
It is especially hard to watch how in the eyes of such a temporary holder there appears the gleam of anticipated absolutism and the thirst for the pleasure of anticipated corruption.
Recently in parliament one could see quite a few such bearers of "golden shares." None of them hid that they counted not on agreeing with an opponent, but on deceiving him and seizing absolute power.
As a rule, when soon their hopes were destroyed and the "share" was devalued or brutally taken away by others — the expression on their faces turned into an embittered grimace of a future avenger. And the eyes hinted: well, the time will come, I'll show you all.
They will show us this week or, at the latest, next week, but still — in March. Because March continues until Wednesday the 31st...
And then "everything will be shown" to us by the one who a hundred times refused to run for office. Whether he will sign the new law on presidential elections or not — is a separate topic. Frankly speaking, this most democratic law resembles preparation for a war that has already passed.
But both in the new and in the old law there is a norm on how to disrupt the election of an unwanted candidate.
For this one needs not to lower, but precisely to raise voter turnout and, having removed all other candidates, simply not let the favorite gain 50%+1 votes.
This can be done both in the second and first rounds. The elections are declared invalid, and repeat ones are scheduled. Meanwhile the president remains in his post. And this can be done several times. And only then change the technology...
Now, if one listens to political scientists and reads sociology with interpretations of citizens' desire for stability and the decline of trust in the opposition, and so on — everything looks like preparation for the scenario "anti-Yushchenko — 3." It is also — Kuchma-3. It will be especially useful, as political technologists say, "niching" Yushchenko as Kuchma's "successor" and so on. But that is already another story...